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LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE FORECLOSURE
CRISIS IN NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE STATES
FRANK S. ALEXANDER
DAN IMMERGLUCK
KATIE BALTHROP
PHILIP SCHAEFFING
JESSE CLARK∗
Introduction
The foreclosure crisis of the early twenty-first century
continues to defy simple solutions and predicted ending points. It
began as a surge in subprime foreclosures in a limited number of
weaker housing markets as early as 2004 and 2005 and was initially
suppressed in many areas by rapidly rising home values. By the
second half of 2006, however, home prices in most places had either
flattened out or turned down, and foreclosures began to spike in more
places, especially in metropolitan areas that had previously
experienced rapid price appreciation fueled by subprime and exotic
home loans.1 Vicious cycles set in quickly, and, within months, the
sand states (Florida, Arizona, Nevada, and California) led the nation
in foreclosure rates.2 In 2009, as unemployment continued to rise, the
∗
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1
Soo Youn, Market’s New Face: Home Prices Flatten, WASH. POST, Dec.
14, 2006, at T1.
2
Shayna M. Olesiuk & Kathy R. Kalser, The 2009 Economic Landscape,
FDIC,
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number of foreclosures of prime loans began to overtake the number
of subprime foreclosures.3 This meant that in many cities the
foreclosure problem spread both geographically and demographically. Although delinquency rates have generally stabilized, and in
some places declined, serious delinquencies remain at historically
high rates.4 With continuing weaknesses in most housing markets,
the prospects for a substantial decline in foreclosures remain dim.
This article focuses on the legislative responses to the foreclosure crisis among states with nonjudicial foreclosure systems—
where mortgage foreclosures are conducted largely outside of the
court system. The goal of this article is to identify efforts to modify
or improve the single-family (one to four unit) residential foreclosure
process—usually with the aim of reducing foreclosures—in response
to the crisis and to identify states with more aggressive legislation.
Because state policy in this area interacts heavily with federal efforts
to reduce foreclosures, especially during the mortgage crisis, we first
review federal foreclosure prevention initiatives, which began in
earnest in 2007. In addition, changes to state law are not the only sort
of measures that states can take, and because local responses can
serve as important complements to state action, we also review
examples of other, non-legislative forms of state and local efforts to
reduce foreclosures. This is critical context for understanding the
limits and advantages of legislative responses to rapidly rising
foreclosures. After reviewing some recent literature on state
foreclosure laws, we then analyze changes to state foreclosure laws
in nonjudicial states from January 2005 through May 2010.5 After
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2009_vol3_1/AnatomyPerfec
tHousing.html (last updated Apr. 27, 2009).
3
Diana Olick, It’s Prime Time in Foreclosures, CNBC, May 28, 2009,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/30984467/It_s_Prime_Time_In_Foreclosures.
4
Serious Mortgage Delinquency Rates Stabilize in U.S. Metros, but Share
of Loans in Foreclosure Grows, NATIONAL HOUSING CONFERENCE, Aug.
16, 2011, http://www.nhc.org/media/August-2011-Foreclosure-ResponseMetro.html.
5
Note that our data collection period ended prior to widespread media
coverage of the problems involving fraudulent or missing foreclosure
documentation and improper procedure, which began in the latter part of
2010 and implicated many major loan servicers, including Bank of America.
See, e.g., Jill Treanor & Julia Kollewe, Robo-Signing Eviction Scandal
Rattles Wall Street, GUARDIAN, Oct. 14, 2010, at 32 (“Bank of America, JP
Morgan and GMAC are among those to have halted foreclosures after
discovering that ‘robo-signers’ had approved thousands of documents.”).
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identifying states with relatively high levels of legislative activity in
this area, we describe some of the more significant changes that
occurred in some of these states.
I.

Nonjudicial vs. Judicial Foreclosure

Each state is unique in its mortgage foreclosure system. In
general, however, state foreclosure regimes tend to be classified as
judicial or nonjudicial. In a judicial state, the foreclosure process
goes through the court system. Lenders are typically required to give
notice before filing the foreclosure complaint. After allowing the
buyer time to respond to the notice, the complaint is served. If the
borrower does not respond to the complaint, her case proceeds to a
default judgment and the court authorizes a foreclosure sale. If a
borrower files a response, the case goes to trial, resulting in a
decision authorizing a foreclosure sale, or an order dismissing the
complaint and forcing the lender to recommence the action at a
future date.6 On the other hand, in the majority of states, where
nonjudicial foreclosure is the predominant method, the lender
typically only needs to send a notice of sale to the homeowner, place
an advertisement in a local paper, and hire an auctioneer to sell the
property.7 To stop a foreclosure sale in a nonjudicial state, the
homeowner must file an affirmative court action.8

6

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5061 (2011) (providing for a judicial
foreclosure process).
7
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.030(8) (2011) (requiring that written
notice of default be transmitted to the borrower at least thirty days before
notice of sale); id. § 61.24.031(1)(a) (providing for thirty days between
initial contact with borrower and notice of default); id. § 61.24.040(3)
(requiring that the notice of sale be published in a local newspaper).
8
Borrowers may also file for bankruptcy to interrupt the foreclosure process
by seeking an automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2006). The automatic
stay is “one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws,” which “gives the debtor a breathing spell from his
creditors,” permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan,
or simply allows the debtor to be relieved of the financial pressures that
drove him or her into bankruptcy. 2 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L.
NORTON, III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 43:4 (3d ed.
2010). The automatic stay process, however, can entail significant costs to
the borrower, including those of a damaged credit record in some
jurisdictions. See NANCY C. DREHER, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 7:10
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A key difference between nonjudicial states and judicial
states is that the foreclosure process tends to move more quickly in
nonjudicial states, giving borrowers less time to respond to the
foreclosure notice, obtain counseling or legal advice, seek a loan
modification, or obtain another foreclosure alternative.9 One measure
of the speed of the foreclosure process in a state is the total time
required from the date of the initial notice of default or foreclosure to
the date of the foreclosure auction or sale—what we call the
minimum “notice-to-sale period.”10 This period typically begins with
some sort of notice that the lender provides to the borrower that the
loan is in default and that foreclosure may be pursued, or with an
initial advertisement announcing the date of the pending foreclosure
sale.11 Assuming a property goes through a foreclosure sale, the
“notice-to-sale period” ends on the date of the foreclosure sale or
auction.
Nonjudicial foreclosure regimes are generally less friendly to
the borrower and more advantageous to the lender than judicial
regimes. They provide borrowers with substantially shorter notice
periods and fewer opportunities to seek loan modifications or legal
assistance. Moreover, states with nonjudicial systems tend to impose
fewer duties on the part of the lender and place the burden on the
(5th ed. 2011) (explaining the split in authorities over whether a creditor’s
reporting of a debtor’s prepetition debts violates the automatic stay).
9
Compare Connecticut, a judicial foreclosure state with a notice-to-sale
period of 157 days, with North Carolina, a nonjudicial foreclosure state with
a notice-to-sale period of eighty-nine days. Amy Crews Cutts & William
Merrill, Interventions in Mortgage Default: Policies and Practices to
Prevent Home Loss and Lower Costs, in BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER
AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 203, 233-36 (Nicholas Retsinas & Eric
Belsky eds., 2008) (depicting state-by-state foreclosure statistics).
10
The statutorily prescribed minimum notice-to-sale period may differ
substantially from the actual time that a borrower is considered to be in the
foreclosure process. In general, the latter will tend to be a longer period,
especially when the foreclosure process slows down significantly as it has in
many states since the foreclosure crisis began. See Tami Luhby, How to
Rescue the Housing Market: Foreclosures!, CNNMONEY (Aug. 31, 2011,
5:27 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/31/real_estate/housing_market_
foreclosures/index.htm (“[M]any mortgage servicers have slowed
foreclosure efforts as they resolve shoddy paperwork practices.”).
11
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.030(8) (2011) (requiring that written
notice of default must be transmitted to the borrower at least thirty days
before notice of sale may be recorded).
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borrower to slow or challenge the foreclosure process. Nonjudicial
foreclosure regimes provide no structured opportunity for a borrower
to have a judicial hearing to contest issues of default or the validity
of a foreclosure.12
The recently publicized problems with improper foreclosure
procedures and fraudulent or missing documentation constitute a
prime example of the advantages of a judicial foreclosure process to
the borrower.13 The suspensions of foreclosure proceedings by large
servicers that occurred in late 2010 began in judicial states only,
having been prompted by court cases in those states.14 Such problems
are very difficult to detect in most nonjudicial states because
borrowers must generally initiate extraordinary interventions in the
foreclosure process by filing suit to stop the regular foreclosure
proceedings—a difficult and expensive process in most nonjudicial
states. Moreover, because foreclosure law in nonjudicial states tends
to include fewer borrower protections,15 the potential for success in
the courtroom is often more limited, which also makes legal
representation harder to obtain.
Many of the recent, more substantive efforts to reduce
foreclosures, including mediation programs, have been commonly
12

See Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation and Other Issues in
Mortgage Servicing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty.
Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 7 (2010)
(statement by Elizabeth Duke, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/
hearings/111/Duke111810.pdf (explaining the differences between the two
types of regimes in waiting periods, notice requirements, methods of
challenging foreclosure, etc.).
13
See, e.g., Treanor & Kollewe, supra note 5 (reporting allegedly improper
foreclosure procedures).
14
See TIMOTHY MCKENNA & DR. CHUDOZIE OKONGWU, NERA ECON.
COUNSELING, FORECLOSURE SUSPENSIONS AND OTHER MORTGAGE
DISPUTES 3 (2010), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_
Residential_Mortgage_Foreclosure_1210.pdf (asserting that all of the
twenty-three states in which these suspensions have taken place allowed for
a judicial foreclosure process, although three of them also allowed
nonjudicial proceedings).
15
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5061(a) (2011) (providing that the
borrower may show cause, if there is any, why the mortgaged premises
ought not to be seized and taken in execution for payment of the mortgage),
with WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.030(8) (2011) (requiring only that the lien
holder provide the borrower with a notice of default and notice of sale).
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found in judicial foreclosure states.16 There are at least two key
reasons for this. First, the nonjudicial/judicial status of a state is itself
an outcome of the state’s historical political environment. That is,
states that tend to have stronger consumer protection laws and
banking and finance regulations tend to have judicial foreclosure
systems. However, this is not an ironclad relationship, as some
nonjudicial states exhibit more rigorous consumer protection laws
and lending regulations than some judicial states. On average,
though, this correlation holds and is generally the result of
differences in ideologies and balances of power in the legislative and
executive branches across different states. Nonjudicial states often
have state legislatures where it has been historically more difficult to
pass strong foreclosure laws favoring borrowers. While some change
might be expected in light of the foreclosure crisis, state legislative
environments in this arena are unlikely to shift quickly.17
A second reason why judicial states are more likely to
initiate efforts to slow or reduce foreclosures is systematic inertia.
That is, the judicial process fundamentally offers more time and
opportunity for incremental interventions, such as mediation programs, than does the nonjudicial process, where such interventions
are more difficult to design and implement without making major
changes to the foreclosure process. One example is the issue of
timing. Adding a mediation requirement to a foreclosure regime may
lengthen the typical foreclosure process by a few weeks or months.
16

ANDREW JAKABOVICS & ALON COHEN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, IT’S
TIME WE TALKED: MANDATORY MEDIATION IN THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS
7 (2009) [hereinafter IT’S TIME WE TALKED], available at http://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/pdf/foreclosure_mediation.pdf.
17
In response to the late 2010 media attention to foreclosure documentation
and process problems, there have already been some proposals in
nonjudicial states to switch to a judicial process. In Massachusetts, for
example, the Secretary of State proposed a judicial foreclosure process in
2010. Jenifer B. McKim, Bill Calls for Court OK to Foreclose, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 6, 2010, at 1; see generally H. 503, 187th Gen. Court, Reg.
Sess. (Mass. 2011); S. 809, 187th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011). In
Virginia, Senator Don McEachin has introduced a bill calling for a
transition to a judicial foreclosure process. S.B. 798, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(VA. 2010) (providing for a transition to a judicial foreclosure process after
July 1, 2011). The bill provides that a court must order the sale of property
subject to foreclosure for deeds of trust entered into on or after July 1, 2011;
however, property secured by deeds of trust entered into prior to July 1,
2011, may still be foreclosed upon using current nonjudicial procedures. Id.
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In many nonjudicial states this would mean increasing the
foreclosure notice period by 100% or more, while in many judicial
states this would be a substantially smaller proportional increase in
the overall foreclosure timeline.18 A second example is that the
judicial process affords a borrower the opportunity to challenge not
only the existence of an underlying default in payment of the debt,
but also the opportunity to challenge the authority of the lender to
initiate a foreclosure.19 Judicial authority and discretion create far
greater latitude to respond to sudden changes.
Figure 1 shows that judicial states tend to have substantially
longer prescribed notice-to-sale periods than nonjudicial states. The
bulk of judicial states have periods of over 100 days and a substantial
number have periods over 200 days. Conversely, no nonjudicial
states have prescribed notice-to-sale periods of over 200 days and
most are under 100 days.

18

Compare New Mexico, a judicial foreclosure state with a notice-to-sale
period of 155 days, with North Carolina, a nonjudicial foreclosure state with
a notice-to-sale period of eighty-nine days. Adding a sixty-day mandatory
mediation period to the New Mexico notice-to-sale period would increase
the notice-to-sale period by over 38%, whereas adding a sixty-day
mandatory mediation period to the North Carolina notice-to-sale period
would increase the notice to sale period by 67%. Cutts & Merrill, supra note
9, at 234 tbl. 7-7.
19
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. § 5061(a) (2011) (providing that the borrower
may show cause, if there is any, why the mortgaged premises ought not to
be seized and taken in execution for payment of the mortgage).
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See, e.g., Treanoor & Kollewe, supra note 5 (reporting
(
alleggedly improperr
forecclosure proceduures).
22
See supra Figuree 1 (depicting the
t distributionn of notice-to-sale periods inn
judiccial states).
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lenders have the option—sometimes contingent on the nature of the
loan or property—of utilizing either a judicial or nonjudicial
foreclosure process.23 Depending on the state, choosing nonjudicial
foreclosure may mean that the lender gives up some of its claims
during or after the foreclosure process, such as the ability to pursue a
deficiency judgment.24 In states where nonjudicial foreclosure is an
option for residential, single-family foreclosures, most lenders tend
to use the nonjudicial process when it is available. In all states,
including the nonjudicial foreclosure states, a lender always has the
option of pursuing foreclosure through a judicial process.
Due to the particularities and variations in state foreclosure
law, the distinction between “judicial” and “nonjudicial” states is not
completely definitive and is subject to gray areas. For the purposes of
this study, we chose to err on being over-inclusive when determining
which states to classify as nonjudicial. As a result, we consider 33
states and the District of Columbia as nonjudicial,25 leaving 17 states
classified as judicial.26
23

See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 60.10.020 (2011) (providing that any lien
on certain personal property may be foreclosed by action in district court,
superior court or summary action).
24
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 86.770(2) (2011) (providing that an action for
deficiency may not be brought against the grantor after a nonjudicial or
judicial foreclosure of a residential trust deed). A deficiency judgment,
when it is allowed, occurs when the lender is not able to recover the full
amount of the outstanding balance and fees by selling the foreclosed
property. It allows the lender to pursue the borrower for the balance of the
debt in excess of either the foreclosure sale price, or the fair market value of
the property at the time of foreclosure. See WASH. REV. CODE § 61.12.070
(“[T]he court shall direct in the decree of foreclosure that the balance due on
the mortgage, and costs which may remain unsatisfied after the sale of the
mortgaged premises, shall be satisfied from any property of the mortgage
debtor . . . .”).
25
The states that we classify as nonjudicial foreclosure states are Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming.
26
Our list is similar to that described in JOHN RAO & GEOFF WALSH, NAT.
CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSING A DREAM: STATE LAWS DEPRIVE
HOMEOWNERS OF BASIC PROTECTIONS 12 (2009) [hereinafter FORECLOSING
A DREAM], available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_
mortgage/

2011-2012

II.

RESPONSES TO THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS

351

The Context for State Legislative Response: Federal Policy
and State and Local Non-Legislative Actions

Before examining state legislative efforts to reduce residential foreclosures during the latter half of the 2000s, it is important to
consider the overall policy context for such legislative actions. For
example, legislative efforts among states to slow the foreclosure
process or lengthen the notice-to-sale period might have been less
common if federal foreclosure prevention and loan modification
programs had been more successful. Specifically, state efforts to
reduce foreclosures might have been more successful if they were
designed differently or if servicers were held more accountable for
their loan modification services.
A.

Federal Policy Efforts to Reduce Foreclosures

As the subprime crisis intensified in the spring of 2007,
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”) Secretary Alphonso Jackson called for
federal funding for foreclosure prevention counseling.27 In the fall,
Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois introduced the Helping Families
Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act, which would have allowed
bankruptcy judges to modify the balance owed on owner-occupied
home loans, an action called a “cramdown.”28 The Durbin bill would
have provided direct relief to those filing for bankruptcy and given
lenders and servicers an incentive to modify loans voluntarily before
state_laws/foreclosing-dream-report.pdf. However, our list is deliberately a
bit more inclusive in favor of the nonjudicial category. The three additional
states that we categorize as nonjudicial are Colorado, North Carolina and
North Dakota. Colorado and North Carolina foreclosure processes have very
minimal roles for the courts and essentially follow a nonjudicial process.
North Dakota permits some residential mortgages to go through nonjudicial
foreclosure but most go through a judicial process.
27
Press Release, Joint Econ. Comm., Momentum Builds for JEC Chairman
Schumer’s Call for Additional Federal Funds to Avert Subprime Foreclosure Crisis (June 5, 2007), available at http://jec.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases (browse by “June 2007”; then follow the
hyperlink dated “06/05/07”).
28
Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2007, S. 2136,
110th Cong. § 101(a)(3) (as introduced by Sen. Richard Durbin, Oct. 3,
2007).
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the borrower filed for bankruptcy. Such a change would, in essence,
have created maximum net present values for residential loans, a
benchmark by which to measure loan modifications. Ultimately,
however, industry lobbyists blocked the bill.
At roughly the same time as Durbin introduced his bill, the
Bush administration announced the Hope Now Alliance, which
included lenders, industry groups and other organizations.29 The
Alliance encouraged borrowers to call a 1-800 number to receive
telephone credit counseling. In December 2007, while opposing
continued calls for bankruptcy modification legislation, the Administration announced that it would promote “streamlined,” but voluntary, modifications for a subset of subprime mortgages.30The plan
was developed in conjunction with the American Securitization
Forum, a structured finance trade group.31Participation in the program was voluntary in nature, however, and it suffered from various
other problems which ultimately limited its impact.32
In July of 2008, with foreclosures continuing to escalate,
Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
(HERA).33 HERA was a complex bill that included the formation of
29

STEPHANIE CASEY PIERCE, NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, EMERGING
TRENDS: STATE ACTIONS TO TACKLE THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 9
(2009), available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/
0902FORECLOSUREREPORT.PDF.
30
Bush Unveils Plan to Help Subprime Borrowers, MSNBC.COM (Dec. 6,
2007, 4:19 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22132648/ns/businessreal_estate/t/bush-unveils-plan-help-subprime-borrowers/#.TqDJBd6InqE.
31
See AMERICAN SECURITIZATION FORUM, STREAMLINED FORECLOSURE
AND LOSS AVOIDANCE FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITIZED SUBPRIME
ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGE LOANS 2 (2007), available at http://www.
americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/FinalASFStatementonStreamline
dServicingProcedures.pdf (“We believe that applying the framework
outlined in this Statement will streamline the loss mitigation efforts of
servicers, and will maximize trust proceeds to investors as compared to the
proceeds typically realized through foreclosure.”).
32
Servicers and the Hope Now Alliance were under pressure to report large
numbers of modifications, but Alan White found that only forty-seven
percent of modifications resulted in reduced payments, and in thirty-five
percent of cases payments actually increased. Alan M. White, Deleveraging
the American Homeowner: The Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage
Contract Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1107, 1116-17 (2009).
33
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122
Stat. 2264 (2008).
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a stronger regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,34 the
authorization of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program,35 tax
breaks for residential builders, a first-time homebuyer’s tax credit,36
and other initiatives. The largest foreclosure prevention component
in HERA was the $300 billion Hope for Homeowners program,
commonly referred to as the “H4H” program.37 H4H was to be run
by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to refinance distressed
borrowers.38 As initially implemented, H4H required lenders to
write-down existing mortgages and refinance borrowers into loans
for not more than ninety percent of their homes’ current values.39
However, the program was not designed to deal with the many
borrowers that had second and sometimes third mortgages layered on
top of their primary loans.40 Holders of junior loans were not inclined
to agree to refinancings that would wipe out their interests. As a
result of this and other problems, the program received only 312
applications from across the entire country in its first two and one
half months of operation.41
34

Id. § 1101.
Id. § 2301.
36
Id. § 3011.
37
Id. § 1402.
38
Id. §§ 1402, 257(b)(1).
39
Id. §§ 1402, 257(e)(2)(B).
40
For example, the proportion of senior mortgages with associated junior
mortgages increased in Massachusetts from twenty six percent in 2003 to
sixty-five percent in 2005. Eric S. Rosengren, President and CEO, Fed.
Reserve Bank of Bos., Current Challenges in Housing and Home Loans:
Complicating Factors and the Implications for Policymakers, Address at the
New England Economic Partnership’s Spring Economic Outlook Conference on Credit, Housing, and the Consequences for New England 11
(May 30, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.bos.frb.org/news/
speeches/rosengren/2008/053008.htm).
41
Dina ElBoghdady, HUD Chief Calls Aid on Mortgages a Failure, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 2008, at A1. HUD modified the program in November 2008
by increasing the maximum loan amount to 96.5% of the appraised value
for some loans, but the changes did not make the program effective. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., Bush Administration
Announces Flexibility for “Hope for Homeowners” Program (Nov. 19,
2008), available at http://archives.hud.gov/news/2008/pr08-178.cfm; Les
Christie, HOPE Prevents 1 Foreclosure, CNNMONEY (Mar. 25, 2008,
12:25 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/25/real_estate/new_hope_plan/
(reporting that the program had since its inception helped prevent only one
foreclosure).
35
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In September 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson
proposed the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),
which was included in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
(EESA) that was signed into law in October of that year.42 In
implementing EESA, however, the Bush Administration declined to
use TARP funds to provide direct assistance to homeowners at risk
of foreclosure.43 In January 2009, the incoming Obama administration obtained Congressional approval to access the second half of
the $700 billion in TARP funds.44 The incoming director of the
National Economic Council wrote to Congress that the new
administration would use $50 to $100 billion of the funds for
foreclosure mitigation.45 The letter also suggested that the new
administration would seek to change bankruptcy laws to permit
cramdowns of primary residence loans.46
In February 2009, the Obama Administration announced its
much-anticipated plan to reduce foreclosures, the Making Home
Affordable (MHA) program.47 In addition to pledging more capital to
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and other government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs), MHA included two primary programs.48 One
42

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§
101-36, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767-800 (2008).
43
See id. § 110 (directing federal agencies to “implement a plan that seeks
to maximize assistance for homeowners . . . to minimize foreclosures.”);
Mark Mooney, Bush to Ask for TARP; Obama to ‘Rebrand’ It, ABCNEWS.
COM (Jan. 12, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Economy/story?id=
6626721&page=1 (explaining Congress’ disapproval over how little of the
TARP funds had been spent on helping homeowners).
44
Id.
45
Letter from Lawrence Summers, Dir.-Designate, Nat’l Econ. Council, to
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, John Boehner,
U.S. Representative, Harry Reid, U.S. Senator & Mitch McConnell, U.S.
Senator (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/
letter_from_lawrence_h._summers_to_congressional_leaders/.
46
Id.
47
Obama Administration to Expand Housing Plan, MSNBC.COM (May 14,
2009, 11:30 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30744879/ns/businessreal_estate/t/obama-administration-expand-housing-plan/; see generally
MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, http://www.making-homes-affordable.com/
(last visited Aug. 21, 2011).
48
Making Home Affordable Program Guidelines, MAKING HOME
AFFORDABLE,
http://www.making-homes-affordable.com/Guidelines/
making-home-affordable-guidelines.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2011)
[hereinafter Making Home Affordable].
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program, the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), allowed
for the refinancing of existing GSE loans up to 125% of the current
value of the home.49 The second and more ambitious component of
MHA, the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), called
on lenders to reduce mortgage payments to thirty-one percent of
borrower income, after which the federal government would pay fifty
percent of the cost of reducing them to thirty-eight percent of
income.50 The plan provided some compensation to servicers and
annual incentives to borrowers who remained current.51 HAMP also
implemented a procedure for evaluating borrower claims for loan
modifications and for implementing the modification process.52
HAMP was complemented by the near simultaneous
introduction of HR 1106, which, among other things, resurrected the
bankruptcy modification proposal contained in the earlier proposal
by Senator Durbin.53 The Senate, however, rejected the cramdown
provision.54 The final bill, the Helping Families Save Their Homes
Act (HFSTHA),55 did include a requirement that, for most mortgages, lenders provide tenants of foreclosed properties with 90-day
notice prior to eviction.56 This was an important provision, not only
due to its intended protection for tenants, but also because it
represented the first time that federal law intervened directly in the
foreclosure process. While some states have adopted their own tenant
notification laws, HFSTHA set a new floor for tenant protection in
the event of foreclosures and may have reduced the level of state
activity in this area.
Without the stick of bankruptcy modification, HAMP relied
chiefly on modest carrots in the form of small incentive payments to
49

HARP—Home Affordable Refinancing Program, MAKING HOME
AFFORDABLE, http://www.making-homes-affordable.com/harp-program.htm
(last visited Aug. 21, 2011).
50
Making Home Affordable, supra note 48.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, H.R. 1106, 111th Cong. § 103
(2009).
54
The amendment was proposed on April 30, 2009, but failed to achieve the
required 60 votes in the affirmative and was later withdrawn from the
Senate. Senate Vote # 174, GOVTRACK.US (Apr. 30, 2009, 2:47 PM), http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s2009-174.
55
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22,
123 Stat. 1632 (2009).
56
Id. § 702(a)(1).
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servicers and borrowers. The Administration hoped that HAMP
would result in more than three million permanent mortgage
modifications.57 Although it was a more substantive and ambitious
effort than the industry-led Hope Now alliance, HAMP was slow to
generate any results: as of October 2010 HAMP had produced almost
1.4 million initial modifications, but fewer than 500 thousand of
these had moved past the trial period and become permanent.58
Moreover, by late 2010, even the pace of temporary modifications
began to slow.59
Unfortunately, HAMP was not well suited to deal with delinquencies and foreclosures driven by growing unemployment and
borrowers whose homes were worth less than their outstanding
mortgage. Without realigning loan balances with property values,
borrowers with severe negative equity60 had limited motivation to
maintain ownership of their houses, especially if it meant defaulting
on other debts or placing severe strains on household finances. At the
same time, without the threat of bankruptcy modification, servicers
and investors had limited incentive to make sustainable loan
modifications in numbers large enough to affect foreclosure volumes.
Another TARP-funded program was the Housing Finance
Agency Innovation Fund for the Hardest Hit Housing Markets (or the
“Hardest Hit Fund”):
In February of 2010, the ObamaAdministration
announced that $1.5 billion from Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) funds would be made
available to five states hit hard by the foreclosure
crisis. These funds were aimed at promoting
“innovative measures” to help families directly
57

See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE
PROGRAM: SERVICER PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH OCTOBER
2010 7 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/Oct%202010%20MHA%20
Public%20Final.pdf (explaining that forty-one percent to fifty-five percent
of the program’s goal of three to four million modification offers had been
met).
58
Id. at 2.
59
Although ninety-four thousand HAMP trials were started in January
2010, only 29,764 were started in December 2010. Id. at 2.
60
“Negative equity” refers to the situation in which the total amount of
indebtedness secured by all mortgages on a parcel of property exceeds the
fair market value of the property.
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affected by the foreclosure crisis. The five states,
which include Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan and Nevada, were those experiencing house
price declines of more than twenty percent from their
peak values. . . . The funding would flow through
state housing finance agencies (HFAs), which have a
great deal of experience with designing and implementing mortgage revenue bond and homeownership
financing programs. . . . In late March 2010, the
Administration announced a second round of the
Hardest Hit Fund (HHF) involving $600 million in
additional funding to five more states . . . .61
The five states covered by the second round—North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island and South Carolina—were states
with areas of dense unemployment.62 A third round of HHF funding,
which was awarded to states with high unemployment rates, provided $2 billion to seventeen states and the District of Columbia,
including nine of the ten states in rounds one and two.63 The third
round of HHF funding was designated specifically for programs to
help unemployed homeowners make their mortgage payments over a
specified period.64 Finally, a fourth round of funding provided an
additional $3.5 billion to states funded in rounds one, two or three.65
B.

State and Local Nonlegislative Action

The most common state and local foreclosure prevention
efforts include outreach and counseling, financial assistance and
legal assistance programs, all of which tend to rely heavily on federal
resources. These efforts are sometimes coordinated or organized via
statewide or local foreclosure prevention task forces or networks.
They may also be complemented by community organizations aimed
61

Dan Immergluck, State Foreclosure Mitigation Strategies: A Comparison
of Round 1 and 2 Hardest Hit Fund Plans in States With Nonjudicial Foreclosure Processes 1 (Oct. 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter
State Foreclosure Mitigation Strategies], available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1695217.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
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at holding lenders more accountable so that they can increase
responsiveness to borrowers’ needs and help borrowers progress
through loss mitigation and loan modification programs.
1. Outreach and Counseling
Housing counselors help assess the financial hardship of
borrowers, determine the options available to them, advocate for
borrowers, and serve as a liaison between borrowers and lenders.
Federal legislation was created in 2007 to fund a national network of
counselors through the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling
(NFMC) program, which is administered by NeighborWorks
America.66 Some states and cities have supplemented this funding
through their own initiatives, and nonprofit organizations have
responded by augmenting their staff and programs to attempt to meet
a much higher demand for services.
Foreclosure prevention counseling appears to make a
significant difference in reducing foreclosures. The Urban Institute’s
recent evaluation of the NFMC program found that in the first two
years of the program, the odds of counseled borrowers curing their
loan defaults and avoiding foreclosure were seventy percent higher
than if they had not received counseling.67 According to the
evaluation, thirty-two thousand homeowners avoided foreclosure as a
direct result of NFMC counseling between 2008 and 2009.68
One of the key challenges for foreclosure prevention counseling programs is to reach out effectively to at-risk homeowners.
Counselors and foreclosure prevention task forces have employed
innovative approaches to reach these borrowers. In Grand Rapids,
Michigan, local residents and organizations created Foreclosure
Response, a comprehensive clearinghouse made up of a diverse
group of stakeholders to disseminate information and coordinate

66

National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program, NEIGHBORWORKS
AMERICA, http://www.nw.org/network/foreclosure/nfmcp/ (last visited Oct.
21, 2011).
67
NEIL MAYER ET AL., NATIONAL FORECLOSURE MITIGATION COUNSELING
PROGRAM EVALUATION: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM EFFECTS,
SEPTEMBER 2010 UPDATE, URBAN INSTITUTE 34 (2010), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412276-prelim-analysis-programeffects-Sep-2010.pdf.
68
Id. at 35.
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interventions.69 Its Eyes Wide Open Program enlists the help of
neighborhood residents as “volunteer monitors” to spread the word
about counseling to neighbors having trouble making payments and
to report neglected vacant homes.70 Foreclosure Response has also
implemented place-based targeted marketing, outreach, and
education efforts.71
The Michigan AmeriCorps Foreclosure Corps program was
created by the Michigan Coalition Against Homelessness, the Michigan Foreclosure Task Force, and the Community Economic Development Association of Michigan.72 It employs AmeriCorps members to
conduct volunteer training, community outreach, client intake, and
educational workshops.73
2.

Financial Assistance

Some nonjudicial foreclosure states provide direct financial
assistance to borrowers. Prior to the advent of the Hardest Hit Fund
program, most state and local efforts to provide direct financial
assistance involved refinancing borrowers into lower-cost, fixed rate
loans, or providing emergency loans to borrowers. Generally, the
scale of these refinancing programs was modest for two reasons.
First, many borrowers had loans that were simply too large to
refinance without first receiving a principal reduction from the
existing lender (i.e., receiving what is known as a “short refinance”).
Second, as unemployment, rather than high-cost loans, began to
cause foreclosures the opportunities to resolve problems by simply
replacing high-cost with low-cost financing declined.
Some states provide short-term emergency assistance
programs to cover late payments and other arrearages for borrowers
who, once these arrearages are resolved, can afford their existing
69

Organizing for Action in Kent County, Michigan, FORECLOhttp://www.foreclosure-response.org/policy_guide/
coordinated_response.html?tierid=315 (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
70
You Can Help Protect Your Neighborhood and Property Values,
FORECLOSURERESPONSE.ORG, http://www.foreclosureresponse.org/?page_
id=166 (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
71
Organizing for Action in Kent County, Michigan, supra note 69.
72
Michigan AmeriCorps Foreclosure Prevention Corps, COMMUNITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION OF MICHIGAN, http://cedam.info/
resources/mftf/mafc.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
73
Id.
SURE-RESPONSE.ORG,
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loan or can qualify for a loan modification. For example, North
Carolina established its Homeowner Protection Program to provide
loans to homeowners who had lost their jobs.74
3. Legal Assistance
Borrowers in most nonjudicial states are often faced with
rapid foreclosure processes, and already financially strapped
homeowners must take affirmative legal action against their lenders
to prevent or delay the foreclosure process. These homeowners are
often unable to afford legal counsel or navigate the legal system on
their own. Additionally, the availability of legal assistance lawyers
who are adequately trained in foreclosure law is uneven in some
areas.75 Some states and localities have responded by partnering with
bar associations to provide pro bono assistance to homeowners at
risk of foreclosure. For example, Arizona’s Lawyers Helping
Homeowners (LHH), a program that assigns pro bono attorneys to
income-eligible homeowners facing foreclosure, is coordinated by
the State Bar of Arizona, Arizona Foundation for Legal Services and
Education and the Arizona Supreme Court.76
Unfortunately, building a strong program of pro bono legal
assistance for homeowners is difficult. Such programs would require
significant additional funding to provide direct legal assistance to the
large volume of homeowners facing foreclosure. While federal
funding for housing counseling has increased significantly since the
advent of the foreclosure crisis, efforts to increase funding for legalassistance-based foreclosure prevention have not received as much
support. In awarding more than $7 billion to states through the
Hardest Hit Fund, the Treasury Department allocated some funding
to counseling but prohibited states from devoting the funding to legal
assistance for borrowers.77 Moreover, as federal, state, and local

74

Summary of N.C. Housing Finance Agency Programs, NORTH CAROLINA
HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY , http://www.nchfa.com/About/facts.aspx (last
visited Oct. 10, 2010).
75
See PIERCE, supra note 29, at 11-12 (comparing the legal training of
foreclosure lawyers in multiple states).
76
Id. at 11.
77
See State Foreclosure Mitigation Strategies, supra note 61, at 6 n.4;
Katrina vanden Heuval, Treasury Blocks Legal Aid for Homeowners Facing
Foreclosure, THE NATION. (Dec. 9, 2010, 10:06 AM), http://www.
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budget pressures continue, legal aid programs may face even greater
resource constraints.
4. Community Organizing and Advocacy
The federal government’s heavy reliance on incentives alone
has hindered its efforts to encourage banks to work with borrowers,
modify loans, and otherwise mitigate foreclosure problems. One
approach that some locally based organizations have taken is to
combine housing counseling with targeted community organizing
and advocacy, aimed either at changing public policy or at
persuading lenders and servicers to work more aggressively to reduce
foreclosures. Around the country, perhaps no other group has been
viewed as more effective in this area than Empowering and Strengthening Ohio’s People (ESOP).78 Formerly called the East Side
Organizing Project because of its focus on the east side of Cleveland,
ESOP has a long history of negotiating with banks around local
lending practices. ESOP developed a strategy called “rank ‘em and
spank ‘em”.79 Under this approach, ESOP meets with homeowners to
determine which lenders are most difficult to deal with and then
campaigns to get the lender to sign a commitment to systematic
modifications.80 By the fall of 2008, ESOP had arranged twelve
signed agreements that covered roughly twenty lenders and
servicers.81 ESOP also participated in counseling, with workout rates
of more than seventy-five percent.82
While ESOP operates in Ohio, a judicial foreclosure state,
there have been significant organizing campaigns to reduce foreclosures in nonjudicial states. In California, the Contra Costa
Interfaith Supporting Community Organization (CCISCO) has
demanded meetings with lenders and servicers.83 CCISCO has also
thenation.com/blog/156973/treasury-blocks-legal-aid-homeowners-facingforeclosure.
78
ESOP, http://www.esop-cleveland.org/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
79
Todd Swanstrom et al., Regional Resilience in the Face of Foreclosures:
Evidence from Six Metropolitan Areas at 14 (MacArthur Found. Research
On Building Resilient Regions, Working Paper No. 2009-05), available at
http://metrostudies.berkeley.edu/pubs/reports/2009-05.pdf.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
CONTRA COSTA INTERFAITH SUPPORTING CMTY. ORG., BANK ACCOUNTABILITY: THE KEY TO KEEPING FAMILIES IN THEIR HOMES 2 (2010)
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tried to slow down the foreclosure process by encouraging counties
to prohibit sheriffs from delivering foreclosure notices unless the
servicer has made a good faith effort to modify the loan.84 They also
engaged in a campaign to persuade the City of Richmond to stop
doing business with banks with high local loan default rates.85
In Georgia, the Atlanta Fighting Foreclosures Coalition
(AFFC) is a group of approximately forty organizations including
unions, housing groups, civil rights groups and others that advocate
public policy changes and pressure large servicers to work with
borrowers through loan modifications. AFFC was successful in
getting one servicer to halt its foreclosures temporarily and drew the
national leadership of the AFL-CIO into discussions with another.86
5. The Role of State Leadership
State political leaders have taken a variety of nonlegislative
steps to reduce foreclosures. Such steps include establishing statewide foreclosure prevention task forces and negotiating agreements
with servicers to improve loan modification and loss mitigation
efforts. At least twenty-four states—both judicial and nonjudicial—
have organized comprehensive task forces to address the foreclosure
problem.87 These task forces bring together public and private
stakeholders to identify priorities and work toward solutions to
reduce foreclosures and mitigate their impact.88 The Massachusetts
Division of Banks organized two working groups, one that focused
on rules and enforcement, while the other focused on consumer
education and foreclosure assistance.89 In Colorado, a task force
available
at
http://ccisco.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/BankAccountability-The-Key-to-Keeping-Families-in-Their-Homes.pdf.
84
Swanstrom et al., supra note 79, at 29.
85
Id.
86
Katrina vanden Heuvel, AFL Takes on Foreclosures and Payday Lending,
THE NATION. (Aug. 19, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www.thenation.com/
blog/154076/afl-takes-foreclosures-and-payday-lending.
87
PIERCE, supra note 29, at 49.
88
See id. at 10 (describing the role of task forces in Arizona and Colorado).
89
See Mortgage Summit Working Groups Release Report, MASS.GOV (Apr.
11, 2007), http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/mortgage-summit-working-groupsrelease-report.html (“[T]wo Working Groups were formed in December
2006 and began meeting in January 2007: one looking at rules and enforcement and the second focusing on consumer education and foreclosure
assistance.”).
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created a video to help train foreclosure counselors.90 Some of the
work of these task forces may eventually lead to changes in state
foreclosure law.
Several governors of nonjudicial states have established
agreements with banks that service large numbers of loans in their
states.91 The specific terms of the agreements include freezing
adjustable interest rates, streamlining loan modification efforts and
reporting progress back to state government. Nonjudicial states that
have implemented these types of agreements include California,
Michigan, Minnesota and Maryland.92 Maryland’s governor negotiated an agreement with six servicers requiring that they (1) provide
homeowners a timely answer after submission of loss mitigation
packages, (2) halt foreclosures while considering the mitigation,
(3) designate representatives who serve as a point of contact during
the foreclosure process, and (4) establish staff incentives for loan
modifications.93
Michigan’s governor reached an agreement with four major
servicers who agreed to reach out to at-risk borrowers, streamline
modifications and offer a five-year interest rate freeze.94 They also
agreed to report regularly to the Michigan Office of Financial Insurance on their outreach and modification efforts.95 The Minnesota
Department of Commerce and state servicers and lenders created the
Minnesota Foreclosure Prevention Compact. The compact involves
voluntary mediation, prevention workshops, housing counselors,
streamlined loan modification and progress reports. It also requires
that lenders submit homeowner contact information to counselors
when the foreclosure process is initiated.96
Besides governors, attorneys general in some states—
including some nonjudicial states—have been key leaders in
90

PIERCE, supra note 29, at 10.
See id. (“Beginning in 2007, governors began working directly with loan
servicers and lenders to create plans for lowering the number of foreclosures.”).
92
Id. at 19.
93
Id. at 20.
94
Radio Address: Granholm Meets with Mortgage Servicers to Ensure They
Will Help Avoid Foreclosures, MICHIGAN.GOV, http://www.michigan.gov/
som/0,1607,7-192-50778-183346--,00.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
95
Id.
96
Press Release, Minn. Dep’t of Commerce, Governor Pawlenty Announces
Additional Actions To Assist Homeowners Facing Foreclosure (Apr. 14.
2008) (on file with author).
91
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addressing the foreclosure crisis. They have investigated mortgage
lenders and servicers over violations of consumer protection and fair
lending laws. One of the outcomes they often seek is the establishment of a program to improve and increase loan modifications. In
October 2010, attorneys general from Arizona, Illinois, Florida,
Colorado, Nevada, New Jersey, Texas and Washington reached a
settlement with Wells Fargo, which agreed to pay $24 million and
reduce the amount owed on certain mortgages by about $400
million.97 The settlement followed an investigation into the
marketing of risky, payment-option mortgages by Wachovia Corp.
and Golden West Financial Corp., both of which were acquired by
Wells Fargo.98 For these loans Wells Fargo agreed to reduce the
loan’s balance to 150% of the home’s value.99 Wells Fargo also
agreed to additional steps that could reduce a borrower’s monthly
payment to no more than thirty-one percent of his or her gross
monthly income.100 Borrowers who make three years of timely
payments could qualify for an additional principal reduction.101
III.

Key Findings from Recent Studies of State Foreclosure
Law

Over the last two years, there have been a number of
analyses of state foreclosure law and efforts to modify such law to
reduce foreclosure levels. These include reports issued by the
National Governors’ Association,102 the National Consumer Law
Center,103 the Center for American Progress,104 and the Pew Center
97

Wells Fargo Mortgage Balances Reduced in 8 States, MYBANKTRACKER.
http://www.mybanktracker.com/bank-news/2010/ 10/07/wells-fargomortgage-balances-reduced-8-states/ (last visited October 19, 2011).
98
Ruth Simon, Mortgage Pact Set for Wells, Eight States, WALL ST. J., Oct.
7, 2010, at C3.
99
Wells Fargo Mortgage Balances Reduced in 8 States, supra note 97.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 29; LAUREN STEWART, NAT’L GOVERNORS
ASS’N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, 2009 STATE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE LAWS (2010), available at http://www.nga.org/
files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1001FORECLOSURELAWS2009.PDF.
103
FORECLOSING A DREAM, supra note 26.
104
See, e.g., IT’S TIME WE TALKED, supra note 16; ALON COHEN &
ANDREW JAKABOVICS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NOW WE’RE TALKING: A
LOOK AT CURRENT STATE-BASED FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS
COM,
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on the States.105 Taken as a whole, this recent literature focuses on
efforts to improve loan modification and loss mitigation efforts,
especially via interventions such as mandatory or voluntary mediation programs. The studies do not focus on nonjudicial foreclosure
states, however, and most do not aim to provide a comprehensive
picture of legislative actions during the foreclosure crisis.
Many states, including California, Colorado, Michigan and
Nevada, have temporarily halted the foreclosure process to facilitate
loan workouts and mediation.106 In the summer of 2009, California
imposed a ninety-day moratorium on foreclosure proceedings.107
However, all the major loan servicers were allowed to continue
unabated because they had comprehensive loan modification
programs already in place.108 As a result, most foreclosures were
unaffected, and the law had minimal impact.109 Conversely, Nevada’s
law provides that the borrower’s election to participate in an optional
mediation program can halt foreclosure proceedings until the
mediation is complete, allowing the time necessary to conduct a
thorough loan evaluation.110
A number of states have sought to protect distressed
homeowners from foreclosure rescue scams that prey on their
confusion and fear. These states have enacted greater restrictions on
programs that promise to avoid foreclosure but are in fact scams
designed to exploit distressed homeowners. The laws typically
require full disclosure of a program’s terms and conditions, a ‘right
to rescind’ period for homeowners, a limitation on the consulting
fees that can be charged, and terms that prevent the transfer of
property to the consultant.111 The legislation often includes penalties

AND HOW TO BRING
TALKING], available

THEM TO SCALE (2010) [hereinafter NOW WE’RE
at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/
pdf/foreclosure_ mediation.pdf.
105
See, e.g., THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM:
STATES RESPOND TO AMERICA’S FORECLOSURE CRISIS (2008) [hereinafter
DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM], http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles
/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Subprime_mortgages/defaulting_on_the_dream.
pdf.
106
STEWART, supra note 102, at 4.
107
NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra note 104, at 27.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 107.086(3) (2011).
111
DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM, supra note 105, at 22.
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for violating these regulations.112 Maryland was one of the first states
to pass such a law in 2005,113 and several other states have followed
suit, including Colorado,114 Massachusetts,115 Minnesota116 and New
Hampshire.117 Maryland’s emergency legislation prohibits predatory
behavior from foreclosure consultants118 and allows homeowners to
collect damages if those provisions are violated. Colorado’s Foreclosure Protection Act prohibits up-front fees,119 requires agreements
to be made in writing,120 and creates a three-day rescission period for
any contract signed with a foreclosure consultant.121
Many states have passed mediation program legislation in an
effort to have servicers and homeowners explore mutually beneficial
alternatives to foreclosure. The goal of these programs is to avoid
unnecessary foreclosures by reaching solutions that benefit all
parties: homeowners remain in their homes, while servicers reduce
their losses from the foreclosure process. Such settlements occur in
up to seventy percent of mediation cases.122 In other cases when a
mortgage is too onerous for a homeowner even after mediation, the
process can facilitate a quicker resolution by negotiating a ‘graceful
exit’ for the homeowner which avoids a foreclosure, such as the
lender agreeing to accept a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure or consenting
to a short sale to a third party purchaser.123 Twenty-one states—most
with judicial foreclosure regimes—had implemented foreclosure
mediation programs by mid-2010 and several more were considering
similar legislation.124 These states vary in their approach, but all are
striving to provide workable alternatives to foreclosure.
112

Id.
MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. §§ 7-305 to 309 (2011).
114
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-1104 to 1110 (2011).
115
940 MASS. CODE REGS. 25.00-03 (2011).
116
MINN. STAT. § 325N.01-.18 (2011).
117
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §479-B:1 to :11 (2011).
118
MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. §§ 7-305 to 309 (2011).
119
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-1107 (2011).
120
Id. §§ 6-1-1104.
121
Id. §§ 6-1-1104 to 1110.
122
ALON COHEN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WALK THE TALK: BEST
PRACTICES ON THE ROAD TO AUTOMATIC FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 2
(2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/11/
pdf/walk_the_talk.pdf.
123
Id.
124
GEOFFRY WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., Executive Summary of
STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS: CAN THEY SAVE
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Nevada is the first nonjudicial state to institute a mediation
program.125 The state legislature passed the bill in May 2009,126 and
the program began two months later. Under Nevada’s mediation
program, nonjudicial foreclosures are referred to a court-supervised
mediation program. It is a voluntary program that the homeowner
must elect to enter within thirty days of being served with a notice of
intent to foreclose.127 Both parties, the servicer and the borrower,
must contribute equally to the mediation fee before the process
begins.128 The servicer must provide a current appraisal of the
property and documentation proving its standing as mortgage-holder
during the mediation process.129 The servicer must be represented by
someone with the authority to finalize a settlement and must negotiate in good faith.130 Once in the program, the foreclosure proceedings
are suspended until the mediator certifies either a settlement or that
the parties acted in good faith but could not reach an agreement.131
Two features are particular to the Nevada program: the
documentation requirement and the good faith requirement.
Producing documentation of loan ownership has proved difficult for
many servicers and may be contributing to a lower foreclosure rate
since the program was instituted.132 The good faith requirement
allows better enforcement of the intent of the program. If the
mediator determines that the servicer is not negotiating in good faith
he can recommend the case to the court to impose sanctions
including the forced acceptance of a settlement determined by the

HOMES?, at v (2009), available at http://www.realestateeconomywatch.com/
wp-includes/upload-files/ReportS-Sept09.pdf; NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra
note 104, at 1.
125
NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra note 104, at 10; see generally NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 107.086(3), 107.086(8) (2011); Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 1
(2009).
126
Assemb. 149, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Nev. 2009).
127
Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 5 (2011).
128
Id. R. 16.
129
Id. R. 8.
130
Id. R. 5.
131
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 107.086(3), 107.086(8) (2011); Nev. Foreclosure
Mediation R. 5, 8, 10, 11, 17 (2011).
132
GEOFFRY WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., STATE AND LOCAL
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS: UPDATES AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS
3 (2010), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_
mortgage/mediation/report-state-mediation-programs-update.pdf.
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judge.133 However, there have been some complaints that the
program’s mediation administrator has impeded enforcement of this
provision.134
California has a very different, and arguably less effective,
approach to loan negotiation than Nevada.135 California requires a
telephone conference between the parties before foreclosure instead
of formal face-to-face mediation with a neutral third-party.136The law
does not require the servicer to include someone with the authority to
modify the loan on the phone call, thus limiting the extent of changes
that can be made.137The homeowner has fourteen days from being
served the notice to call a 1-800 number that will provide a list of
local housing counselors.138 Contacting the counselor is not required
by law, however.139Because there is no third-party supervision, the
servicer only has to certify that it made an attempt to contact the
homeowner.140All of these factors significantly weaken the efficacy
of the law. In light of negative feedback from participants and the
failure of the modification program to reduce the rate of foreclosure,
some have proposed that the law should be revised to include a thirdparty monitor to moderate the discussions. These measures have met
with resistance in the state legislature due to funding concerns

133

See Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 6 (“A hearing shall be held, to the
extent that the court deems necessary, for the limited purposes of determining bad faith, enforcing agreements made between the parties within the
Program, including temporary modification agreements, and determining
appropriate sanctions pursuant to NRS Chapter 107 as amended.”).
134
Some critics of the program have argued that the administrator has
prevented effective sanctions even though the authorizing statute
specifically provides for such sanctions. Mortgage Mediation Program,
Nevada Public Radio (Jan. 3, 2011), available at http://www.knpr.org/
son/archive/detail2.cfm?SegmentID=7465&ProgramID=2131.
135
For further discussion on the California loan modification program, see
IT’S TIME WE TALKED, supra note 16, at 27 (summarizing California’s
mandate to use a telephone hotline rather than mediation).
136
Id.
137
See id. (“Most importantly, the servicer may (but is not required to)
involve loss mitigation personnel in the call.”).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(h), (g) (2011).
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because California’s program, unlike Nevada’s, does not charge any
fee for the mediation services.141
A survey of these and other mediation programs identifies
several important considerations for states moving forward with
these efforts. Two of the biggest issues regarding the effectiveness of
mediation are how the mediation program is scheduled and how the
results of such programs are tracked. Most states utilizing mediation
have made it voluntary instead of automatically scheduled and have
suffered from low participation rates as a result.142After ten months
of implementation, Nevada’s voluntary program only had a twentyone percent participation rate.143Thus, experience indicates that
automatically scheduling mediation is crucial to creating greater
participation among eligible borrowers. The other significant issue is
a lack of adequate outcome reporting in many existing programs.
California, Nevada, and Michigan have no formal reporting requirements and other programs tend to collect only broad information that
does not provide useful detail. This makes it difficult to assess
programs, recognize trends or problems in a locality, and share best
practices among states.144
Another issue is the distinction between negotiation and
mediation programs. States that utilize negotiation—such as
California, Michigan, and Oregon—lack a neutral third party to
monitor the proceedings.145 Mediation is likely to provide greater
accountability by requiring a neutral third party.146 A fourth issue is
the timing of mediation within the foreclosure process. It should

141

Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 16 (2011); NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra
note 104, at 28.
142
NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra note 104, at 4.
143
Id. at 10
144
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 7 (2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atj/effective-mediation-prog-strategies.pdf (“The way to
determine whether a mediation program is actually effective is through careful tracking and evaluation of program data. At a minimum, participation
and settlement rates should be tracked. A more comprehensive approach
would include tracking not just the occurrence of a settlement, but also the
substance of the agreement . . . , the time period for achieving resolution
. . ., and whether homeowners had the assistance of a counselor or
attorney. . . .”).
145
NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra note 104, at 5.
146
Id. at 5-6.
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occur as early as possible to maximize its benefits and permit enough
time to complete the process.
The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) recommends a
loan modification strategy called mandatory loss mitigation.147This
method requires the servicer to conduct an analysis of potential alternatives to foreclosure. Loss mitigation is part of some state foreclosure laws but is often not adequately enforced. CRL recommends
including a loss mitigation application with any formal pre-foreclosure communication in order to gather necessary borrower
information such as income and other debt obligations that help
determine eligibility.148
The CRL report also suggests requiring a loss mitigation
analysis as early in the pre-foreclosure process as possible. The
standards to conduct such an analysis should build on existing
regulations such as the federal HAMP requirements or those of
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA, because doing so would
avoid the need for each state to develop their own standards.149
Another recommendation is to require an affidavit explaining to the
homeowner why they did or did not qualify for a loan modification.
This form would provide accountability for the homeowner to
confirm that the servicer used the correct inputs and would allow
judicial intervention if necessary.150The CRL strongly recommends
including enforcement standards in the loss mitigation process that
hold servicers responsible to both the borrower and the general
public while giving states the power to police these efforts.151Finally,
mediation should be incorporated into the appeals process when a
homeowner is denied a loan modification.152

147

See SARA WEED & SONIA GARRISON, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
FORECLOSURE AS A LAST RESORT: STATES CAN STABILIZE THE HOUSING
MARKET BY PREVENTING UNNECESSARY FORECLOSURES 1 (2010), available
at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/
states/20101021-State-Loss-Mit-Brief-Final.pdf (suggesting that states use
“an existing industry standard, ‘mandatory loss mitigation’”).
148
Id. at 9.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 10.
152
Id.
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An Analysis of Legislative Activity in Nonjudicial States
A.

The Scope of Legislative Changes

We now directly examine changes in state laws that affect
the servicing, default and foreclosure processes of single-family (1-4
unit) residential mortgages. The intent is to understand the scale,
scope and nature of the changes that state legislatures adopted as the
foreclosure crisis developed and spread nationally. After first
analyzing the numbers and types of adopted laws, as well as their
relationship to a state’s foreclosure rate, we then identify a set of
legislatively active states in different parts of the country and
examine policy changes in these states more closely. This analysis
focuses on the state legislative provisions that cover practices and
processes concerning both previously originated mortgages and the
handling of loans at some stage of delinquency, default or
foreclosure.153 For contextual purposes, we also analyze the
frequency of laws affecting the origination of mortgage loans and, in
particular, provisions to tighten the regulation of high-risk lending or
to improve consumer protections in the origination process.
153

Not included here are legislative measures aimed at the problems
associated with vacant, foreclosed homes and the spillover problems they
impose on neighborhoods. These laws include statutes permitting localities
to adopt vacant property registration ordinances. Our primary approach was
to begin by building a data set of all legislation adopted in nonjudicial
foreclosure states from January 2005 to May 2010. For each of the thirtythree nonjudicial states and the District of Columbia, we used Westlaw to
identify potentially relevant changes in law by searching the legislative
service as well as the bill summaries databases since 2005. Depending upon
the theory of mortgage law followed in a given jurisdiction, we searched for
terms such as “deed of trust,” “mortgage,” “security deed” and
“foreclosure.” We reviewed thousands of enacted bills and code sections
relating to the foreclosure process, culling the results to include only
relevant pieces of enacted legislation. Once all enacted legislation was
identified, each act was coded for the types of provisions that it contained;
these categories and subcategories are detailed in Figure 2. Then,
summations were tabulated across various categories of provisions and over
the five-year period. Because legislative calendars vary across states and
legislative activity ebbs and flows at different times in the year, this part of
the study only looks at laws enacted through calendar year 2009 instead of
looking at the entire timeframe for which we have data (January 2005
through May 2010).
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However, the focus is primarily on nearer-term efforts to reduce
foreclosures among loans that have already been originated.
The four main categories of legislative provisions154 are
those concerning: (1) the foreclosure sale/auction process itself, and
processes and issues immediately following the foreclosure
sale/auction; (2) the pre-foreclosure sale process,155 such as the
establishment of mediation programs, notice requirements and
procedures, rights to cure and reinstate, and direct efforts to slow or
stop foreclosures such as forbearance programs or moratoria;
(3) ancillary processes, including data collection and recording
requirements; and (4) regulation of loan servicers.

154

The term legislative “provisions” is used specifically to mean provisions
within acts that were deemed to change some aspect of the mortgage
process or requirements in the state. The number of such provisions is not
equivalent to the “number of adopted bills” or the “number of acts” because
one act may include multiple measures affecting different aspects of the
mortgage or foreclosure process. Each act was coded for whether it had a
substantive impact on each of the categories and subcategories identified.
Thus, one act might be coded as falling into several categories.
155
By “pre-foreclosure sale process,” we mean activities that occur between
the time a loan becomes delinquent or in default and the time a foreclosure
sale occurs and the property is auctioned either to a third party or to the
mortgagee.
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Figure 2. Breakdown of Adopted Legislative Provisions: January
2005 to May 2010
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Provisions concerning pre-foreclosure sale processes
constituted sixty-one percent of the provisions enacted during the
study period. The next largest category was provisions concerning
foreclosure sale, post-sale and deficiency issues, which accounted for
seventeen percent of all provisions. Fifteen percent of provisions
concerned supportive processes such as data collection and
recording. Only thirteen provisions (seven percent) concerned
servicer regulation.
Of the sixty-one percent of provisions concerning preforeclosure sale processes, a bit more than half concerned preforeclosure sale notice and advertising requirements. The next largest
subcategory, accounting for thirteen percent of all provisions and just
over twenty percent of the pre-foreclosure sale process provisions,
was provisions that directly prevented foreclosures at least on a
temporary basis, such as moratoria or forbearance initiatives. Perhaps
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somewhat surprisingly, provisions calling specifically for the
availability of counseling or mediation accounted for only six percent
of all provisions. This is likely explained by the difficulty of
requiring mediation or counseling activities within the structure of a
nonjudicial foreclosure system. Such initiatives have been much
more common in judicial states.156
B.

Changes in Legislative Activity over Time

The largest increase in legislative provisions aimed at the
foreclosure problem, other than lending and consumer protection
laws, were those concerning the pre-foreclosure sale process,
including those encouraging mediation efforts or loan modification,
those requiring increased or earlier notices to borrowers, those
changing the foreclosure timeline (typically expanding it), and those
imposing some sort of a moratorium on foreclosures. These
provisions remained essentially flat from 2005 to 2007 at seven to
ten provisions adopted per year, but they increased quite rapidly in
2008 and 2009 as the national foreclosure crisis peaked. Nonjudicial
states adopted twenty-five such provisions in 2008 and forty-five in
2009.

156

IT’S TIME WE TALKED, supra note 16, at 7.
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Figure 3. Number of Legislative Provisions Adopted in
Nonjudicial States, 2005 – 2009
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The rise in lending and consumer protection provisions
began earlier than the rise in pre-foreclosure sale process provisions,
doubling from twenty-one to forty-two from 2006 to 2007. These
sorts of provisions continued to accelerate as the magnitude and
nature of the subprime crisis intensified and the consequences of
poor underwriting became more widely known. Of course, the
collapse of many subprime originators and the retrenchment of mortgage market investors from the high-risk loan market were likely also
factors in the growing adoption of such provisions, as the number,
resources and political strength of opponents of such regulation
diminished over this period.
In addition to changes in the pre-foreclosure sale process,
there were modest changes in the number of provisions addressing
the regulation of loan servicers and supportive processes, such as
data collection, reporting and the recordation of foreclosure sales.
The former increased from zero in 2006 to five in 2009. The latter
decreased modestly from two to four between 2005 and 2007, before
increasing to six in 2008 and eleven in 2009.
Legislative activity affecting foreclosure sales, post-sale
activities, and deficiency issues, however, does not show any
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consistent pattern of growth. The annual number of these provisions
bounced around from three to nine between 2005 and 2009.157
Nonetheless, the results here suggest that some legislatures gave at
least modest attention to the loan servicing and foreclosure process
even before these problems received national attention.
Among the legislative activities seeking to impact the preforeclosure sale process, legislation regulating the foreclosure notice
and advertising process grew most between 2007 and 2009. The
number of provisions in this subcategory increased from three in
2006 and five in 2007 to sixteen in 2008 and nineteen in 2009.
Legislative activity also increased noticeably in the area of foreclosure forbearance, modification and moratoria (from zero to one in
2005 through 2007 to seven in 2008 and eleven in 2009) and in the
area of mediation and counseling (from zero in 2005 through 2007 to
one in 2008 and eight in 2009). Activity affecting the presale rights
of borrowers and tenants and the availability of nonjudicial
foreclosure increased less.
C.

Provisions That Lengthened or Shortened the
Pre-foreclosure Sale Process

One problem that distressed borrowers face in many nonjudicial states is a relatively short foreclosure timeline. In general, the
notice-to-sale period in judicial states tends to be significantly longer
than in nonjudicial states. In places with brief notice-to-sale periods,
opportunities for obtaining a loan modification or attaining some
more favorable alternative to foreclosure (e.g., short sales) are more
constrained. In fact, cure rates (the rate at which distressed borrowers
recover from severe delinquency or default before losing their home
via foreclosure, short-sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure) fall and
foreclosure completion rates increase when pre-foreclosure sale
periods are less than four months.158
During the latter half of the 2000s, several states took steps
to add notice periods or lengthen existing periods to provide more
opportunities to avoid foreclosure, and only two states reduced the
pre-foreclosure sale period. In one of these states, however, the
157

This period predates the attention given to problems of false or fraudulent documentation and improper foreclosure procedures involving many
major lenders. Widespread awareness of these issues did not occur until the
fall of 2010, after the focus period of this study.
158
Cutts & Merrill, supra note 9, at 203.
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change was not substantial (five days),159 and in the other state it was
a temporary measure intended for abandoned properties or cases
where borrowers requested an expedited foreclosure.160 A total of
twenty acts between 2005 and 2009 increased the notice-to-sale
period. Moreover, most were enacted in 2008 (six) and 2009 (eight).
Most of these changes ranged from a few days to thirty days, with a
couple of exceptions. In California, for example, an act in 2009
increased the time between a notice of default and a notice of
foreclosure sale by ninety days for mortgages originated between
2003 and 2007. Other nonjudicial states that adopted laws that
increased the pre-foreclosure sale process by more than thirty days
included Maryland, Massachusetts and Michigan. Some of these acts
only applied to certain subsets of loans or borrowers, however, such
as loans originated over a specified period.

159

CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(a)(4) (West 2011) (providing that the person
authorized to take a sale may file a notice of sale up to five days before the
lapse of the three-month notice-to-sale period).
160
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-903(1)(c) (2011) (providing that an eligible
debt holder may file a motion for an order for expedited sale if “the property
has been abandoned or, in the alternative, the grantor of the deed of trust
requests the order for expedited sale”).
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Figure 4. Legislative Provisions Addressing Pre-foreclosure Sale
Process by Subcategory
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Figure 5. Number of Acts Increasing/Decreasing the Foreclosure
Notice-to-Sale Period
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Analysis of Legislative Activity across States

Thirty nonjudicial states enacted legislation affecting the
national foreclosure crisis. Colorado, Minnesota and Nevada adopted
the most substantive changes, each adopting laws containing fifteen
or more provisions and together accounting for twenty-five percent
of all provisions. Oregon, North Carolina, Arizona and California
adopted laws containing ten to fourteen provisions, and another ten
states adopted between five and nine provisions. Thirteen states
adopted fewer than five provisions during this period, and three
states and the District of Columbia adopted no substantive
provisions.
Provisions affecting the pre-foreclosure sale processes
accounted for at least half of the provisions adopted in twenty-one
states. Provisions affecting foreclosure sale and post-sale processes,
as well as supportive processes, including data recording provisions,
were fairly widely distributed across states. Fifteen states adopted
one or more provisions addressing foreclosure sale and post-sale
processes, and nineteen states adopted one or more provisions
concerning supportive processes such as data reporting or recording
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requirements. Servicer regulations, the smallest category of activity,
were more concentrated. Only six states (Colorado, North Carolina,
Arizona, Virginia, Hawaii and New Mexico) adopted any provisions
concerning servicer regulation.
Colorado enacted the most legislation affecting the preforeclosure sale process, having adopted twelve such provisions.161
Nevada, Minnesota, Michigan and California adopted between eight
and eleven provisions in this category, and Washington, Tennessee,
Oregon, Utah and Arizona adopted six to seven such provisions.
Another five states adopted four to five provisions, and eleven states
adopted one to three provisions. Seven states and the District of
Columbia adopted no provisions in this category.

161

One possible explanation for Colorado’s high level of activity is the fact
that the state’s foreclosure problems predated the rise of foreclosures in
many other states. This is because Colorado’s foreclosures were related
partly to the weakened state economy following the dot-com bust in the
early 2000s. Given the nature of state legislative processes and behavior, it
may well take more than one legislative session to get a proposed measure
through the legislature. Moreover, there is also a natural lag between the
timing of a problem and the legislative response. For these reasons, the 2005
to early 2010 period may coincide more with the peak of Colorado’s
legislative activities, while in other states high levels of activity did not
begin until the later part of this period and may be extending well beyond
the period. This explanation is consistent with the fact that a relatively large
share of the measures in Colorado was adopted before 2009 as compared to
other states.
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Figure 6. Adopted Provisions by State, January 2005 to May 2010
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Figure 7. Adopted Provisions Concerning Pre-foreclosure Sale
Processes, January 2005 to May 2010
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Overall, the most common types of pre-foreclosure sale
provisions were those concerning pre-foreclosure notice and
advertising requirements (accounting for over fifty percent of preforeclosure sale provisions) and provisions aimed at the direct
prevention of foreclosures, such as forbearance or moratoria
(accounting for over twenty percent). Provisions specifically aimed
at providing for counseling or mediation in the pre-foreclosure
process accounted for just under ten percent and were more prevalent
in some of the most active states, including Nevada, Minnesota and
Michigan. The paucity of such initiatives in most other nonjudicial
states contrasts with the prevalence of high-profile mediation
programs in many judicial states, most notably Connecticut, Florida,
New York and Pennsylvania.
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Several states took steps to lengthen or shorten the notice-tosale period.162 The vast majority of these provisions were aimed at
lengthening the presale process. There were only two exceptions.
California adopted a provision that effectively shortened the
prescribed notice-to-sale period by five days, although the state
adopted other measures that effectively lengthened the foreclosure
process.163 Colorado adopted a law that, until 2013, provides for an
expedited foreclosure process for abandoned properties or in cases
where the borrower requests such a process.164 Most of the processlengthening provisions made relatively modest changes (thirty days
or less) to the notice-to-sale period, although in some states with very
quick foreclosure processes, even fifteen to thirty days can be a
substantial increase. Many of the states that effectively increased the
notice-to-sale period did so in conjunction with efforts to provide
increased notice or opportunities for loan modifications and
mediation.

162

A number of states took measures to shorten post-sale redemption
periods. These are not covered in this analysis of pre-foreclosure notice-tosale periods.
163
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(a)(4) (West 2011).
164
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-903(1)(c) (2011).
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would not expect to see similar responses in Montana and Nevada,
for example.165
Indeed, states with very high foreclosure rates tended to have
higher levels of legislative activity. However, there is a substantial
amount of variance in legislative activity that is not explained by
foreclosure rate.166 For example, California had higher levels of
legislative activity than Arizona despite similarly high foreclosure
rates. Some states with more moderate foreclosure rates, such as
Oregon and Colorado, had significantly higher amounts of legislative
activity than states with somewhat higher foreclosure rates such as
Georgia, Mississippi and Rhode Island. As might be expected, states
with very low foreclosure rates (e.g., North Dakota, Wyoming,
Montana, South Dakota and Alaska) saw very little legislative
activity.
Most of the legislative activity between January 2009 and
May 2010 focused on outstanding loans and not on regulating new
originations because legislative activity in the two areas is positively
correlated. States that were active in one area tended to be active in
the other as well.

165

A more sophisticated goal would be to model legislative activity over
time and across states, controlling for multiple factors that might affect such
activity. The effort here is much less ambitious; there is no attempt to
identify or control for all of the various causes of such activity or to predict
legislative activity.
166
The straight line in each figure is a linear bivariate regression line. The
R-square, which gives the proportion of the variance in legislative activity
that is explained by the foreclosure rate, is approximately 0.40 for both
plots.
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Figure 9. Adopted Provisions Concerning Outstanding Loans
versus Foreclosure Starts
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Figure 10. Adopted Provisions Concerning All Loans versus
Foreclosure Starts

Total Number of Adopted Measures,
Jan 2009 to May 2010
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V.

Policy Change in Selected States

In-depth analyses of California, Colorado, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon and Washington are revealing.
The following profiles qualitatively describe the activity in each of
these states, identifying the major changes and determining whether
the changes in foreclosure law in the state, on net, tended to favor the
borrower or the lender. The profiles are not an exhaustive or
definitive list, however, and are meant to serve as a sample of the
states that were most active.
A.

California

Prior to the enactment of California’s recent foreclosure
legislation, the first step in California’s nonjudicial foreclosure
procedure was the filing of a notice of default in the office of the
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county recorder.167 Within ten days of the recordation, the lender
mailed a notice of the recording date to each borrower and to each
person who had requested such notice. 168 After filing the notice of
default, the lender had to wait three months before giving notice of
the sale.169 A written notice of the time and place of the pending
foreclosure sale had to be posted on the property, posted in the city or
judicial district where the property was to be sold, and recorded with
the county recorder at least fourteen days before the foreclosure
sale.170
From January 2005 to May 2010, California adopted ten
foreclosure-related provisions, eight of which addressed the preforeclosure process. The most significant change to existing
mortgage law was contained in Assembly Bill 7, the Foreclosure
Prevention Act of 2009. 171 Between May 21, 2009, and January 1,
2011, a lender had to wait an additional ninety days after the threemonth statutory period expired before providing notice if the
mortgage was a first mortgage on an owner-occupied home and was
recorded between January 1, 2003, and January 1, 2008. 172 This
additional delay was intended to allow the parties to pursue a loan
modification.173 The lender could avoid this additional ninety-day
delay if the lender had obtained an order of exemption by
implementing a comprehensive loan modification program.174 Such a
program was intended to keep borrowers in their principal residence
when the expected recovery from modification was greater than the
expected recovery from foreclosure.175 The servicer must have
sought to achieve long-term sustainability for a borrower pursuing
modification by limiting the ratio of their housing-related debt to
their gross income to thirty-eight percent or less.176 Finally, the
167

CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(a)(1) (West 2011).
Id. § 2924b(b)(1).
169
Id. §§ 2924(a)(2)-(3).
170
Id. § 2924f(b)(1).
171
The California Foreclosure Prevention Act added sections 2923.52 and
2923.53, the effects of which are discussed in this paragraph. These sections
were subject to sunset provisions, however, and expired on January 1, 2011.
California Foreclosure Prevention Act, Assemb. 7, 2009-2010 Leg., 2nd
Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 2009).
172
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.52(a) (West 2009) (repealed Jan. 1, 2011).
173
Id.
174
Id. § 2923.53(a) (repealed Jan. 1, 2011).
175
Id. § 2923.53(a)(1) (repealed Jan. 1, 2011).
176
Id. §§ 2923.53(a)(2) (repealed Jan. 1, 2011).
168
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program had to include some combination of an interest rate reduction, term extension, deferral of some portion of the principal
amount, reduction of principal, or compliance with a federally
mandated modification program such as HAMP.177
Another law adopted the year before the Foreclosure
Prevention Act extended the pre-foreclosure timeline.178 Senate Bill
1137 states that prior to filing a notice of default for a mortgage
executed or recorded between January 1, 2003, and December 31,
2007, the lender must first contact the borrower in person or by
telephone to assess their financial situation and explore options to
avoid foreclosure.179 During this required contact, the borrower must
be advised of her right to request a subsequent meeting, which must
occur within fourteen days.180 The lender must provide a toll-free
telephone number to a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.181
The lender is able to meet this contact requirement despite failing to
contact the borrower if contact was attempted with due diligence, a
statutorily defined standard involving a series of mailing and
telephone attempts.182 The lender cannot file the notice of default
until thirty days after either the initial contact or the satisfaction of
the due diligence requirement.183
Senate Bill 1137 also extended an advanced notice of sale to
renters of a foreclosed property.184 Until January 1, 2013, notice of a
pending foreclosure sale must also be provided to the residents of the
foreclosed property if the billing address on the mortgage does not
match the property address.185 The notice must inform the residents
that the property will be sold no less than twenty days from receipt of
the notice and inform the residents that if they are renters, they are
entitled to sixty days notice of eviction or a new lease agreement
with the new property owner.186 This is an extension from the
previous fourteen-day notice of sale and thirty-day notice of eviction.
177

Id. § 2923.52(a)(3) (repealed Jan. 1, 2011).
Id. § 2923.5(a)(2).
179
S. 1137, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2008).
180
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(h) (West 2011).
181
Id.
182
Id. § 2923.5(g).
183
See id. § 2923.5(a)(1) (outlining when a trustee, mortgagee, or other
authorized agent may file a notice of default).
184
S. 1137, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 4 (Cal. 2008).
185
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924.8(a) (West 2011).
186
Id. § 2924.8(a).
178
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Since this law was passed, however, HFSTHA was passed. HFSTHA
includes a requirement that, for most mortgages, lenders are now
required to provide tenants of foreclosed properties with a ninety-day
notice prior to eviction.187
Senate Bill 306, passed in late 2009, also extended the notice
of sale requirements from fourteen days to twenty days.188 More
significantly, it clarified the intent of pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs) regarding the responsibilities of the servicer to the
investors of mortgage-backed securities.189 This was intended to
promote beneficial loan modifications and address concerns that
some PSAs might impede loan modifications.190 The statute states
that any duty a servicer has to maximize net present value (NPV) for
investors should be interpreted as requiring maximization of NPV for
all investors as a group and not any one particular investor.191 Thus,
if the expected recovery from a loan modification exceeds the
expected recovery from a foreclosure on a net present value basis
then the servicer can implement the modification in the best interests
of all the investors.192
Several other laws adopted during this period altered the
foreclosure process. Assembly Bill 2678 prevents a notice of sale
from being posted while the servicer is in negotiations with the
borrower to modify a loan.193 Senate Bill 1221 reduces the period for
a notice of sale by no more than five days before the end of the
statutory three-month waiting period.194
Overall, most of the provisions passed by California between
January 2005 and May 2010 were intended to favor the borrower.
However, the effectiveness of some of these provisions has been
called into question.195 The Foreclosure Prevention Act is notable in
this regard: it allowed all of the major servicers to gain an exemption
187

Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §
702(a), 123 Stat. 1632, 1660-61 (2009).
188
S. 306, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
189
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.6(a) (2011).
190
Id. § 2923.6(b).
191
Id. § 2923.6(a).
192
Id. § 2923.6(a)(2).
193
Assemb. 2678, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
194
S. 1221, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
195
For example, the effectiveness of California’s loan modification program
has been undermined by that state’s failure to involve a neutral third-party
mediator in the modification process. NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra note
104, at 27-28.
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from the ninety-day waiting period because they already had
comprehensive loan modification programs that complied with
HAMP guidelines.196
B.

Colorado

Colorado’s foreclosure process is essentially a hybrid of
judicial and nonjudicial processes because the lender must obtain an
initial court order authorizing the foreclosure.197 Before 2005,
Colorado’s foreclosure procedure provided that at least thirty days
after default on a deed of trust, the debt holder could file a notice of
election of remedies with the public trustee of the county where the
property was located.198 The combined notice, which included the
notice of sale, the right to cure, and the right to redeem, had to be
mailed no more than twenty days after the recording of this notice.199
The combined notice also had to be published once per week for five
consecutive weeks prior to the sale.200
Currently, the lender’s initial motion to foreclose has to be
accompanied by a copy of the instrument containing the power of
sale, a description of the property, and an explanation of the default
justifying the foreclosure.201 The clerk sets a time between twenty
and thirty days after the filing of the motion for a hearing.202 Notice
of this hearing has to be posted in a conspicuous place on the
property and has to be served on each person named in the motion at
least fifteen days before the date set for the hearing.203 If the court
196

CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2924-2924b (2011); HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM: HANDBOOK FOR
SERVICERS OF NON-GSE MORTGAGES §§ 1.1-1.2 (Jun. 1, 2011), available
at
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mha
handbook_32.pdf.
197
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-105(2)(a) (2011).
198
See id. § 38-38-101(a)-(h) (stipulating that, “[w]henever a holder of an
evidence of debt declares a violation of a covenant of deed of trust and
elects to publish all or a portion of the property therein described for sale,
the holder or the attorney for the holder shall file . . . with the public trustee
of the county where the property is located”).
199
Id. § 38-38-103(1)(a).
200
Id. § 38-38-103(5)(a).
201
COLO. R. CIV. P. 120(a) (2011).
202
Id.
203
Id. 120(a)-(b); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-105(3) (“Not less than
fifteen days before the date set for the hearing . . . the holder or the attorney
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grants the lender’s motion based on its findings, the lender must
submit a bid to the officer no later than the second business day
before the foreclosure sale.204 Prior to the changes discussed here, the
sale had to occur between forty-five and sixty days after the
recording of the notice of election and demand.
In the period between January 2005 and May 2010, Colorado
was the most active state in adopting provisions to change the
foreclosure process and timeline. The Colorado legislature enacted
many measures early in this period. In total, Colorado enacted
nineteen such provisions, twelve of which directly affected the preforeclosure process. The first significant change came in 2006, when
Colorado passed House Bill 1387.205 This law increased the amount
of time required between the filing of the notice of election and
demand and the date of the foreclosure sale by sixty-five days.206 The
new law requires that the sale take place between 110 and 125 days
after the notice, instead of just forty-five to sixty days after the
notice.207 The contents of the notice were also expanded.208 Under
House Bill 1387, a notice of election must contain specific
information, including the names of the original parties to the deed of
trust, the name of the holder of the note, the remaining outstanding
balance on the loan, a legal description of the property and a
statement of the default that justifies the foreclosure.209
In 2008, another important piece of legislation was passed.
House Bill 1402 extended the pre-foreclosure timeline by thirty days
and required the lender to notify the borrower of certain foreclosure
counseling programs.210 The law requires that the lender or servicer
for the holder seeking an order authorizing sale under this section for a
residential property shall cause a notice of hearing . . . to be posted in a
conspicuous place on the property that is the subject of the sale.”).
204
Id. § 38-38-106(1).
205
See H.R. 1387, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (adding
definitions to the foreclosure chapter and repealing and re-enacting foreclosure procedure statutes).
206
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-108(1)(a) (2011).
207
Id.
208
Id. § 38-38-101(4)(a)-(j).
209
Id.
210
See H.R. 1402, 66th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2008)
(requiring mortgagee to provide mortgagor with a notice containing the
phone number of the Colorado foreclosure hotline and “the direct telephone
number of the holder’s loss mitigation representative or department” at least
thirty days before filing notice of demand and election).
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mail a notice of intent to foreclose to the borrower at least thirty days
prior to filing the formal notice of election and demand, thus
increasing the foreclosure timeline.211 The notice of intent to
foreclose must also contain the telephone number of the Colorado
foreclosure hotline and the direct telephone number of the holder’s
loss mitigation department. 212
In 2009, the state legislature passed House Bill 1276, which
created additional requirements to notify the borrower of
opportunities for foreclosure deferment.213 The law states that within
fifteen days of filing the notice of election and demand, the holder
must post a notice of the opportunity for foreclosure deferment in a
conspicuous place on the property or personally serve the borrower
with such notice.214 Within twenty days of the posting, the borrower
must contact a foreclosure counselor, who must inform them of the
federal HAMP program.215 The counselor then has thirty days to
determine whether the borrower is eligible for a foreclosure
deferment.216 This determination includes an assessment of the
borrower’s ability to pay and the probability of reaching a mutually
beneficial loan modification.217
If the borrower is eligible for deferment, she must make
payments to the lender equal to at least two-thirds of the monthly
payment that was due prior to the delinquency throughout the term of
the deferment, which is initially ninety days.218 If the borrower
qualifies for a foreclosure deferment, all remaining published and
mailed notifications of the foreclosure sale must be cancelled.219 The
deferment can be terminated early under a number of circumstances,
including if the borrower abandons the property or fails to comply
with the conditions of deferment.220
In 2010, the Colorado legislature passed House Bill 1249,
creating a temporary procedure to shorten the foreclosure process for

211

COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-102.5(2) (2011).
Id.
213
H.R. 1276, 67th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2009).
214
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-802(1) (2011).
215
Id. § 38-38-803(2)-(3).
216
Id. § 38-38-803(5)(a).
217
Id. § 38-38-804(1)(a)-(b).
218
Id. § 38-38-803(6); id. § 38-38-805(2)(a).
219
Id. § 38-38-803(6).
220
Id. § 38-38-805(4)(a)-(e).
212
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certain properties.221 Beginning on August 1, 2010, and continuing
until August 1, 2013, a lender filing a foreclosure may request an
expedited sale at the same time.222 The lender must file a motion with
the court stating that the lender is eligible, that the deed of trust
secures an eligible debt, and that the property has been abandoned or
that the borrower requests the order for an expedited foreclosure.223
A notice of the hearing must be posted on the property or personally
served on the borrower at least fifteen days prior to its occurrence.224
If the court finds the evidence clear and compelling and no one
objects,225 the lender must then set a date of sale between forty-five
and sixty-five days after the recording of the notice of election and
demand.226
Colorado also passed several provisions between January
2005 and May 2010 that did not affect the foreclosure timeline. For
example, House Bill 1197 created an official county-level foreclosure database that would report notices of election and demand,
properties sold at auction and instances of curing.227 The bill was
intended to provide the general public and policy makers with
accurate information, help facilitate trend forecasts and make it easy
to analyze regional differences.228 In addition, House Bill 1207 made
several minor changes to the cure and redemption procedures and
added certain parties to the list of those required to receive
notifications of the foreclosure.229
Overall, the provisions adopted in Colorado favored the
borrower by extending the notice-to-sale period by almost three
months and mandating notification of foreclosure hotlines and
deferment options. House Bill 1387 (2006), House Bill 1402 (2008)
and House Bill 1276 (2009) were the key pieces of legislation in this
shift toward a more borrower-friendly foreclosure process. As
explained above, one important aspect of the deferment process
created by House Bill 1276 is the requirement that borrowers pay
66.66% of the required monthly mortgage payments while in
221

H.R. 1249, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-902(1)(a) (2011).
223
Id. § 38-38-903(1)(a)-(c).
224
Id. § 38-38-903(2).
225
Id. § 38-38-903(3).
226
Id. § 38-38-902(2).
227
H.R. 1197, 67th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2009).
228
Id.
229
H.R. 1207, 67th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2009).
222

2011-2012

RESPONSES TO THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS

395

deferment.230 Supporters suggest that this requirement focuses efforts
on those most likely to succeed with a loan modification,231 but it
may also unnecessarily exclude other candidates, thus limiting the
number of people who benefit from the program.
C.

Michigan

The adopted provisions in Michigan favored the interests of
the borrower by requiring notice of various foreclosure mediation
opportunities. In Michigan, notice of a pending nonjudicial foreclosure sale must be published in a local newspaper at least once a
week for four consecutive weeks.232 The notice must state (1) the
names of the borrower, the originating lender and the current lender
or mortgagee; (2) the date of the mortgage and of its recordation;
(3) the amount due; (4) a description of the house; and (5) the length
of the post-sale redemption period.233 Fifteen days after notice is first
published, a copy of that notice must be posted in a conspicuous
place on any part of the home.234 Within twenty days of sale, the
purchaser must record the foreclosure deed.235 The post-sale redemption period ranges from one month for residential mortgages on
abandoned property with greater than two-thirds of the original
indebtedness outstanding,236 to one year for occupied residential
properties with less than two-thirds of the original indebtedness
outstanding.237
Between January 2005 and May 2010, Michigan adopted
eight foreclosure-related provisions, all of which affected the preforeclosure process. Six of these provisions were contained in three
statutes enacted in mid-2009: House Bills 4453, 4454 and 4455.238
These bills comprised a package of legislation requiring foreclosing
lenders to offer modification negotiations to borrowers. The key
230

H.R. 1276, 67th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 5 (Colo. 2009).
PIERCE, supra note 29, at 24.
232
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3208 (2011).
233
Id. § 600.3212.
234
Id. § 600.3208.
235
Id. § 600.3232.
236
Id. § 600.3240(7)-(12).
237
Id. § 600.3240(12); see also id. § 600.3241a (providing that abandonment is determined by a statutory procedure and scheme of presumptions).
238
H.R. 4453, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009); H.R. 4454, 95th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009); H.R. 4455, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009).
231
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provisions of the legislation require that the lender provide written
notice to the borrower containing an explanation of the default and
the amount outstanding on the mortgage, the lender or servicer’s
contact information and a designated party for modification
discussions.239 The notice must also provide a list of approved
housing counselors and inform the borrower that she may request a
meeting with the lender’s designee within fourteen days of the notice
to attempt to work out a modification.240 The notice must inform the
borrower that if she pursues modification discussions, foreclosure
proceedings will be deferred for ninety days after the notice was
mailed.241 The notification must also indicate that the lender must
proceed via a judicial foreclosure if the borrower meets statutory
modification criteria but the parties cannot reach a modification
agreement.242
Within seven days of mailing this notice to the borrower, the
lender or servicer must also publish a notice informing the borrower
of her rights as described above.243 If the lender fails to comply with
the pre-foreclosure notice requirements—including notice of the
right to mediation—before commencing the foreclosure process, the
borrower may bring an action to enjoin the foreclosure.244 A
borrower who wishes to work out a modification of a mortgage loan
must elect to engage in modification discussions by contacting a
housing counselor within fourteen days of the lender mailing the
notice of default.245 Furthermore, the housing counselor must notify
the lender of the borrower’s request within ten days of being
contacted by the borrower.246 The counselor must then schedule a
meeting for modification discussions and attend the meeting if the
borrower so requests.247
If no loan modification results from the discussions, the
housing counselor must work with the borrower to determine
whether she qualifies for a modification based on criteria similar to

239

MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.3205a(1)(a)-(c) (2011).
Id. § 600.3205a(1)(d).
241
Id. § 600.3205a(1)(e).
242
Id. § 600.3205a(1)(g).
243
Id. § 600.3205a(4).
244
Id. § 600.3205a(5).
245
Id. § 600.3205b(1).
246
Id.
247
Id. § 600.3205b(3).
240
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federal HAMP requirements.248 If the borrower is eligible, the lender
may not proceed with nonjudicial foreclosure but can pursue judicial
foreclosure.249 The borrower has fourteen days from notification of
any proposed modification to accept it.250 If the lender attempts to
proceed with the nonjudicial foreclosure process in violation of this
procedure, the borrower may file suit to convert the proceeding to a
judicial foreclosure.251 One important aspect is that the calculations
made to determine the borrower’s eligibility must be made available
to the borrower, a requirement not present in some other states.252
In addition to these changes, Michigan adopted Senate Bill
749, which disallowed nonjudicial foreclosure against service
members during active duty or six months thereafter.253 This was one
of the very few changes in state laws during this period that added
restrictions on the use of nonjudicial foreclosure.
D.

Minnesota

In Minnesota, the lender must give six weeks’ published
notice of the pending foreclosure sale and must serve the homeowner
with a copy of the notice at least four weeks before the sale.254 Along
with the notice of foreclosure sale, and with every subsequent written
communication regarding the foreclosure mailed to the borrower, the
lender must also include a foreclosure advice notice.255 Within six
months of the foreclosure sale, the borrower may redeem the
property by paying the foreclosure sale price plus interest.256
Minnesota adopted sixteen foreclosure-related provisions in
the period between January 2005 and May 2010, nine of which
affected the pre-foreclosure process. Most of the provisions made
small changes to existing law. The state is notable for failing to pass
248

Id. § 600.3205c(1); see also HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROsupra note 196, at §§ 1.1-1.2 (codifying eligibility criteria for a
loan).
249
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3205c(6) (2011).
250
Id. § 600.3205c(7)(b).
251
Id. § 600.3205c(8).
252
Id. § 600.3205c(5)(a).
253
S. 749, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008).
254
MINN. STAT. § 580.03 (2011).
255
Id. § 580.041(1)(b); see also id. § 580.041(2) (stating the required
content of every foreclosure advice notice).
256
Id. § 580.23(1)(a); see also id. § 582.032 (abandoned residential property
is subject to a shorter, five week redemption period).
GRAM,
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optional mediation legislation in 2009, when the state legislature
could not override Governor Tim Pawlenty’s veto.257
One important provision was contained in 2008 House File
3420, which requires notification to the borrower of available foreclosure counseling services.258 The notice may be sent concurrently
with the notice of default and must state that such services are
available from authorized foreclosure counseling agencies and that
the lender will transmit the borrower’s contact information to an
approved agency within one week.259 If an authorized foreclosure
prevention agency is in contact with a borrower, it must provide
notice of such counseling assistance to the lender by way of a
specified form.260 The lender must return this form within fifteen
days along with the contact information for the agent authorized to
discuss the terms of the mortgage and negotiate a resolution to the
default.261
Another important provision was contained in Senate File
2559, which allows the borrower to postpone the foreclosure sale of a
property classified as a homestead in exchange for agreeing to reduce
the post-sale redemption period to five weeks.262 If the original
redemption period was six months, the borrower can postpone the
foreclosure sale by five months.263 If the original redemption period
was twelve months, the borrower can postpone the sale for eleven
months.264 This was intended to provide more time for the borrower
to cure the default.
Minnesota adopted other provisions that changed the foreclosure process or content of the notices. Senate File 2918 allowed
the post-sale redemption period for an abandoned property to be
shortened from one year to five weeks.265 Sufficient evidence of
abandonment must be included in the notice of pending foreclosure
sale posted on the property.266 Senate File 1302 required the
257

NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra note 104, at 33.
H.R. File 3420, 85th Leg. Sess., 2nd engrossment art. 5 § 7 (Minn.
2008).
259
MINN. STAT. § 580.021(2)-(3) (2011).
260
Id. § 580.021(4).
261
Id.
262
S. File 2559, 86th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Minn. 2010).
263
MINN. STAT. § 580.07(2)(a)(1) (2011).
264
Id. § 580.07(2)(a)(2).
265
S. File 2918, 85th Leg. Sess., 2nd Engrossment § 1 (Minn. 2008).
266
MINN. STAT. § 582.032(6)-(7) (2011).
258
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foreclosing lender to provide the borrower’s contact information to a
foreclosure prevention agency.267
Minnesota’s changes also favored the borrower. The most
significant provisions required notification of modification opportunities and allowed postponement of the foreclosure sale in exchange
for a shortened redemption period. However, the state failed to pass
mediation legislation to provide a more structured method to prevent
foreclosures.
E.

Nevada

In Nevada, lenders must file a notice of default that describes
the deficiency with the county recorder.268 The foreclosure sale
cannot occur until at least three months after the filing of the notice
of default.269 After the three-month period expires, the lender must
file a notice of the foreclosure sale stating its time and place.270 A
copy of this notice must be provided to the borrower, posted in three
public places for twenty consecutive days, and published once per
week for three consecutive weeks in a local newspaper.271 A copy of
the notice must be posted in a conspicuous place on the property no
later than three business days after the notice of sale is recorded, and
a separate notice must also be mailed to any tenant or subtenant
within the same three-day period.272
Nevada was a very active state during the study period and
was the most active state during 2009 and the first five months of
2010. From January 2005 to May 2010, the state adopted fifteen
provisions regarding the foreclosure process, eleven of which
directly affected the pre-foreclosure process. Nonetheless, the state
may have reacted slowly, given the magnitude of its foreclosure
problem.
The most significant action was the creation of a foreclosure
mediation program in 2009, the first in a nonjudicial foreclosure
state.273 The state legislature and the Nevada Supreme Court
267

S. File 1302, 86th Leg. Sess., 3rd Engrossment § 4 (Minn. 2009).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.080(3)(a) (2011).
269
Id. § 107.080(2)(d) .
270
Id. § 107.080(4).
271
S. 128, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Nev. 2009).
272
NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.087 (1)(a) (2011).
273
See id. § 107.086(3)-(8) (providing that the debtor may elect to enter into
a mediation and that each mediation must be conducted by a senior justice,
268
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promulgated rules for the foreclosure mediation program.274 The
authority to issue rules for the program was contained in Assembly
Bill 149, which applies to any owner-occupied residential foreclosure
and permits lenders and borrowers to exchange information and
proposals to avoid foreclosure with the assistance of a mediator.275
During mediation, the foreclosure process is suspended, and the
lender can take no further action against the borrower.276 The Nevada
Supreme Court rules state that mediation must take place within 135
days after recording the notice of default.277
The mediation program is mandatory if a homeowner
requests it by completing the Election/Waiver of Mediation Form
within thirty days after being served the notice of default.278 Failure
to act within this prescribed time period waives the borrower’s right
to mediation. 279The parties are entitled to a total of four hours for
mediation280 and each must pay a $200 fee before entering the
program.281 The lender must be represented by someone with the
authority to modify the loan282 and must provide, prior to mediation,
the original deed of trust, the note, documentation of each assignment
of the deed of trust and note, and a recent appraisal.283 The lender’s
representative must be physically present at the meetings unless the

judge, hearing master or other designee pursuant to the foreclosure
mediation rules adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court).
274
See generally id.; Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 1 (2011) (“Pursuant to
the jurisdictional authority provided by Chapter 107 of the Nevada Revised
Statutes and the Nevada Supreme Court’s inherent power to create rules for
the efficient administration of justice, these rules are enacted to apply to the
mediation of any owner-occupied residential foreclosure arising from the
recording of a notice of default and election to sell on or after July 1,
2009”).
275
Assemb. 149, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Nev. 2009).
276
NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(3) (2011).
277
Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 1 (2011).
278
NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(3) (2011); Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R.
1.3, 8 (2011).
279
NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(3) (2011); Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R.
8.4 (2011).
280
Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 13.2 (2011).
281
Id. R. 5, 6.
282
Id. R. 10(a).
283
Id. R. 11.3.
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mediator determines otherwise.284 A party to mediation may file a
petition for judicial review seeking a determination of bad faith
participation and sanctions.285 Such petitions must be filed within
thirty days of the date of the mediator’s statement and must be
reviewed by the court within sixty days.286
Other legislation made more modest changes to the foreclosure process. Assembly Bill 65 was adopted to provide additional
funding for the foreclosure mediation program by assessing a $50 fee
for filing a notice of default and election to sell.287 Assembly Bill 140
was passed in 2009 to protect and inform renters of foreclosed
properties.288 Notices of default and of sale must be posted on the
property and sent to the tenants along with information of their rights
to remain in the unit or leave after the foreclosure sale.289 Senate Bill
128 created new recording requirements for the foreclosure deed
after a sale is executed.290 The lender must record it within thirty
days of the sale or deliver it to the winning bidder within twenty
days.291 The winning bidder must then record the sale within ten days
of the bidding.292
Nevada’s adopted provisions clearly favored the borrower.
The mediation program was designed to provide alternatives to
foreclosure by forcing lenders to negotiate modifications. While the
required mediation fee may be a burden for some borrowers, many
other aspects of the program provide a clear benefit to borrowers,
such as requiring the lender to produce the original deed of trust, the
mortgage note and documentation of each assignment. Other
provisions adopted by the state offer better protection for renters or
have a minimal impact on either party.
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(5) (2011); Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R.
10.1(a) (2011).
285
Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 21.1 (2011).
286
Id. R. 21.2.
287
Assemb. 65, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5.8 (Nev. 2009).
288
See Assemb. 140, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3.2 (Nev. 2009) (criminalizing
defacing a notice of foreclosure and establishing rights and duties of
foreclosure sale purchasers and tenants in possession).
289
NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.087(3) (2011).
290
See S. 128, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Nev. 2009) (requiring trustee to
record sale within thirty days and sheriff to record sale within thirty days).
291
NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.080(9)(a)-(b) (2011).
292
Id. § 107.080(9)(b).
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North Carolina

North Carolina, like Colorado, has a foreclosure process that
is a hybrid of nonjudicial and judicial processes. The lender must
send the borrower a detailed statement of the amount of principal,
interest, fees, expenses and disbursements claimed due as of the date
of the statement.293 At least thirty days after sending this written
statement, the lender must file notice of hearing with the clerk of
court.294 At least ten days before the hearing, a notice specifying the
time and place of the hearing must be served on the borrower.295 If
the borrower cannot be personally served despite reasonable and
diligent efforts, the notice may be posted in a conspicuous place on
the property provided that it is posted at least twenty days before the
date of the hearing.296 The hearing is held before the clerk of court
who must find the existence of a valid debt, a default, a right to
foreclose and the requisite notice before authorizing the lender to
proceed.297
Once authorized, the lender must give notice of the sale,
which must provide the date, hour, and place of sale in addition to
other information.298 The notice must be mailed at least twenty days
prior to the date of sale to the borrower and to any occupants of a
property of fewer than fifteen units.299 Notice of the sale must also be
published weekly for at least two successive weeks in a local
newspaper.300 Within five days after the sale, the foreclosing party
must file a report of the foreclosure sale with the clerk of the superior
court.301
North Carolina adopted eleven provisions related to foreclosures in the state, five of which changed the pre-foreclosure
process. Several of the provisions created significant new procedures
that extended the timeline by offering more opportunities to negotiate
293

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(c)(5a) (2011).
Id. §§ 45-21.16(c)(5a), 45-21.16(a).
295
Id. § 45-21.16(a).
296
Id.
297
Id. § 45-21.16(c)(7)(d).
298
See id. § 45-21.16(a) (providing that the notice must contain a description of the property, state the terms of the sale, and provide certain statutory
notices regarding rights of possession and the tenants’ right to terminate the
lease).
299
Id. § 45-21.17(4).
300
Id. § 45-21.17(1)(b)(1), (2)(b).
301
Id. § 45-21.26(a).
294
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a loan modification. Enacted in 2008, House Bill 2623 stated that at
least forty-five days prior to the filing of a notice of hearing in a
foreclosure proceeding for a primary residence, lenders and servicers
of subprime loans must send written notice by mail to the borrower
to inform him of the availability of resources to avoid foreclosure.302
This notice must include an itemization of all past due amounts
causing the loan to be in default, an itemization of any other charges
that must be paid in order to bring the loan current, a statement
regarding negotiation and foreclosure counseling options, and the
contact information for the party who is authorized to work with the
borrower to avoid foreclosure.303
House Bill 2623 also established the State Home Foreclosure
Prevention Project, which empowered the Commissioner of Banks to
evaluate subprime loans to determine which were most suitable for
foreclosure prevention efforts.304 To provide more time for mediation
and loan modification efforts, the Commissioner could extend the
allowable filing date for any subprime foreclosure proceeding by up
to thirty days beyond the earliest filing date established by the preforeclosure notice.305
Senate Bill 974, adopted in 2009,306 gave more power to the
clerk of courts during the pre-foreclosure hearing. Specifically, the
clerk can inquire into efforts the lender has made to communicate
with the debtor to resolve the matter voluntarily before the foreclosure proceeding.307 For owner-occupied homes, the clerk must
order the hearing continued up to sixty days if he finds that there is
good cause to believe that additional time or measures have a reasonable likelihood of resolving the delinquency without foreclosure.308
The clerk could base this decision on the quality of communication
between the two parties, whether the borrower had the intent and
ability to resolve the delinquency after a modification, or whether the
lender had offered appropriate resolution options such as forbearance
and loan modification.309
302

Emergency Program to Reduce Home Foreclosures, H.R. 2623, 2008
N.C. Sess. Laws 226 § 1 (2008).
303
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-102 (2011).
304
H.R. 2623, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 226 § 1.
305
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-105 (2011).
306
S. 974, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 974.
307
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16C(a) (2011).
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Id. § 45-21.16C(b).
309
Id.

404

REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. 31

A third provision extended deficiency judgment protections
to a wider class of mortgages. House Bill 1057 prohibited deficiency
judgments on any owner-occupied residential loans originated or
modified on or after January 1, 2005, if the loan is subject to negative
amortization or permits deferred payments of principal or interest.310
These loans must also conform to the standards published by Fannie
Mae.311
North Carolina’s actions favored the borrower. They created
the opportunity to extend the pre-foreclosure timeline by up to sixty
days for many owner-occupied properties and focused on protecting
subprime borrowers. Legislation also offered certain borrowers
greater protection from deficiency judgments.
G.

Oregon

Upon default by the borrower, an Oregon lender must file a
notice of default in the county clerk’s office.312 After recording the
notice of default at least 120 days before the foreclosure sale, a
notice of sale must be served upon or mailed to the borrower.313 The
notice of sale must name all the parties to the trust deed, describe the
property, state the default and the amount owed, and set forth the
date, time and place of sale.314 A notice must be addressed to each
residential tenant as well, and should include information regarding
his or her rights and tenancy.315Finally, a copy of the notice of sale
must be published in a newspaper in each of the counties in which
the property is situated once per week for four successive weeks.316
On the tenth day after the foreclosure sale, the purchaser is entitled to
possession of the premises.317
Oregon adopted twelve foreclosure-related provisions
between January 2005 and May 2010, mostly towards the end of the
310

H.R.1057, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 441§ 1.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38A(a)(3) (2011).
312
OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735(3) (2009).
313
Id. § 86.740(1) (providing that notice may be requested by any person by
filing a request for a copy of any notice of sale or default); id § 86.785 (providing that such request must be recorded after the trust deed was recorded
and before notice of default was recorded).
314
Id. §§ 86.745(1)-(7).
315
Id. § 86.745(9).
316
Id. § 86.750(2).
317
Id. § 86.755(5)(a) (2009).
311
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study period. Seven of these affected the pre-foreclosure process.
Senate Bill 628 required that a form to request a loan modification be
sent with or before the notice of sale.318 The borrower must return the
form within thirty days of receiving it to qualify for a loan modification.319 Once the lender receives the completed form, it has forty-five
days to determine the borrower’s eligibility based on information
relayed in the form, such as income and expenses.320 The lender may
also request additional information from the borrower.321 During this
period, the foreclosure process is suspended and the borrower can
request a meeting to discuss loan modification options.322 If
requested, this meeting must include a representative of the lender
authorized to modify the loan terms.323 House Bill 3610 adds a
requirement that borrowers who are denied a modification must be
informed as to why they were not eligible.324 It is worth noting, however, that these loan modification review and meeting requirements
are currently set to expire January 2, 2012.325
Senate Bill 239 gave certain rights to borrowers who did not
receive timely notice of the foreclosure sale.326 If the borrower did
not receive the notice prior to twenty-five days before the sale took
place, then the borrower retained the same rights as a junior lien
holder that was not joined in a judicial foreclosure filing.327 Senate
Bill 301 provided alternative ways to meet the requirement to serve
notice of sale to interested parties.328 If diligent efforts were unsuccessful, the law allowed the notice to be conspicuously posted on the
property and then mailed to the last known address of the interested
parties.329 House Bill 2980 stated that a notice of sale becomes
effective as of the date it was mailed.330
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S. 628, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Or. 2009).
Id.
320
S. 628, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Or. 2009).
321
Id.
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Id.
323
Id.
324
H.R. 3610, 75th Leg. Assemb., Spec. Sess. § 1 (Or. 2010).
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OR. REV. STAT. § 86.737 note (2009).
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S. 239, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Or. 2009).
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Id.
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See S. 301, 74th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Or. 2007) (permitting
lenders to, inter alia, post notice if personal service cannot be effected).
329
Id.
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H.R. 2980, 73rd Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1(2) (Or. 2005).
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Oregon’s adopted provisions generally favored the borrower.
Senate Bill 628 and House Bill 3610, in particular, were intended to
offer the borrower an alternative to foreclosure and a way to keep
lenders accountable in their efforts. Other provisions protect
borrower rights if proper notice is not served.
H.

Washington

In Washington, notice of default must be sent by the lender
to the borrower at her last known address.331 Notice must also be
either posted in a conspicuous place on the premises or served
personally on the borrower.332 The notice must contain a description
of the property, a statement of the default, an account of any amounts
in arrears and an explanation of the effect of foreclosure.333 At least
ninety days before the sale, the lender must record the notice of sale
in the office of the county auditor.334 The notice of sale must be sent
to the borrower and any occupants of the property and must provide
the date and time of the sale, describe the default, list any cure
amount and the deadline to cure, explain the effect of the sale and
provide contact information for the lender.335 The notice of sale must
also be published in a local newspaper, once between the thirty-fifth
and twenty-eighth day before the date of sale, and once between the
fourteenth and seventh day before the sale.336 The sale may not occur
less than 190 days after the date of default or less than ninety days
after the recording of the notice of sale.337 On the date and at the time
set for the sale, the lender must sell the property at public auction to
the highest bidder.338 The sale is final as of the time the lender
accepts a bid, so long as the deed is recorded within fifteen days.339
The lender or other winning bidder is entitled to possession of the
331

WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.030(8) (2011); see also id. § 61.24.031
(requiring that written notice of default must be transmitted at least thirty
days before notice of sale may be recorded and such notice of default may
not be transmitted until at least thirty days after initial contact with the
borrower has been made).
332
Id. § 61.24.030(8).
333
Id. § 61.24.030(8)(a)-(l).
334
Id. § 61.24.040(1)(a).
335
Id. § 61.24.040(f).
336
Id. § 61.24.040(3).
337
Id. §§ 61.24.040(8), 61.24.040(1)(a).
338
Id. § 61.24.040(4).
339
Id. § 61.24.050.
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property on the twentieth day following the sale.340The purchaser of
tenant-occupied property must provide written notice to the
occupants and tenants.341 The tenant in possession must be given
sixty days’ written notice to vacate.342
Washington adopted eight provisions concerning foreclosure
procedures, seven of which affected the pre-foreclosure process.
Senate Bill 5810 created special requirements for owner-occupied
loans made between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2007.343
Upon default, the lender must contact the borrower to ascertain her
ability to repay the loan and discuss options for avoiding foreclosure.344 The borrower has a right to request a subsequent meeting
with the beneficiary, which must occur within fourteen days of the
request and which may occur telephonically.345 In addition, the notice
of default must indicate that this required first contact with the
borrower occurred or that the beneficiary tried with due diligence to
contact the borrower but was unsuccessful.346
Senate Bill 6711 was adopted in 2008 to create the Smart
Homeownership Choices Program, which was modified a year later
by Senate Bill 6033 to become the Prevent or Reduce OwnerOccupied Foreclosure Program.347 This program is intended to assist
homeowners facing foreclosure by pursuing loan workouts and
modifications.348 The program targets borrowers that are making less
than 140% of the county median income.349 Attorneys, mortgage
brokers, housing counselors and other relevant housing professionals
volunteer with the program to provide advice to at-risk borrowers.350
While not as active as other states, Washington took some
modest steps to shift the foreclosure process slightly in favor of the
borrower. However, the principal measures only impacted a certain
subset of mortgage foreclosures or were temporary in nature.
340

Id. § 61.24.060(1).
Id. § 61.24.060(2)-(3).
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Id. § 61.24.146(1).
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S. 5810, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wash. 2009).
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Analysis

Overall, legislatures in nonjudicial states adopted a substantial number of changes to foreclosure law, especially as the national
foreclosure crisis swelled in 2008 and 2009. The states adopted
almost two hundred substantive provisions that concern mortgage
default, servicing and foreclosure processes between January 2005
and May 2010. In particular, there was a significant increase in
legislative activity from 2006 through 2009. During that period, the
number of adopted provisions increased from just twelve in 2006 to
seventy in 2009. The majority of this increased activity concerned
pre-foreclosure-sale processes, while smaller shares of activity concerned foreclosure sale and post-sale processes, servicer regulation
and ancillary issues.
There was considerable variation in the level of legislative
activity across states. Some states passed no laws with substantive
provisions during the study period while others passed laws with ten
to twenty substantive provisions. Three states accounted for twentyfive percent of the adopted provisions, and ten states accounted for
sixty percent. In general, states with the highest foreclosure rate
during the second half of 2007 and all of 2008 (e.g., Arizona,
California and Nevada) adopted the greatest number of provisions
during 2009 and the first five months of 2010. States with very low
levels of foreclosures (e.g., Alaska, Montana and Wyoming) saw no
legislative activity. However, among states with relatively moderate
levels of foreclosures there was a substantial variation in legislative
activity. Some (e.g., Idaho and Virginia) saw only one or two
provisions adopted during the latter period while others (e.g., Oregon
and Colorado) saw seven or eight provisions adopted. Moreover,
there were a few states (Georgia, Mississippi and Rhode Island) that
had moderately high foreclosure levels but very small amounts of
legislative activity. Consequently, it appears that other characteristics
besides a state’s level of foreclosures, such as its political
environment or preexisting foreclosure law, were also important
determinants of legislative activity.
A closer examination of the nature of the changes in foreclosure law in eight legislatively active states shows that there were
some commonalities in the changes made in state foreclosure law. As
expected, the adopted changes were largely in favor of the borrower.
Most of these changes occurred during 2008 and 2009, a time when
policymakers were under significant pressure to respond to the local
and national foreclosure crisis. At the same time, many of the
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changes would have to be considered quite marginal. Many involved
small changes in notice periods or directions to lenders and servicers
to take particular steps, some of which they may already have been
doing.
Some of the provisions concerning the pre-foreclosure
process were components of larger efforts to increase opportunities
for loan modifications. Relatively few of these efforts involved thirdparty mediation. More focused on longer notice-to-sale periods, but
also on additional notices, connections to hotlines and housing
counselors, and related procedures. Notably, only Colorado351 passed
a law that reduced the notice-to-sale period. It is important to note,
however, that most nonjudicial states already had relatively brief preforeclosure periods, especially compared to most judicial states.
Few states passed legislation addressing issues of the details
of the foreclosure sale itself, such as minimum bid requirements, the
availability of deficiency judgments, or other issues. Moreover, no
nonjudicial state made a substantial move to adopt a judicial foreclosure process.
Some states with substantial post-sale redemption periods
(Michigan and Minnesota) did move towards either shortening these
periods for abandoned properties or essentially converting post-sale
redemption time into presale notice time.
Given the time period of our study, it is perhaps not surprising that very little legislative activity concerned the regulation of
the servicers and processes that would directly address the loan and
mortgage documentation issues that have recently become so well
understood. While the increased media attention will likely spur
increased attention to these issues, nonjudicial states paid little
attention to these problems prior to the summer of 2010.
VII.

Conclusion

This study shows that significant numbers of nonjudicial
foreclosure states did take some steps to try to reduce foreclosures,
including changes in foreclosure law. Moreover, some of the more
legislatively active states took steps to make the foreclosure process
favor borrowers more than it had before the crisis. However, many of
these provisions constituted quite marginal changes; many were
temporary measures aimed only at loans originated during the
subprime boom and others were effectively redundant with federal
351

See supra notes 160, 164 and accompanying text.
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foreclosure mitigation efforts. Furthermore, in many nonjudicial
states, there was little substantive legislative response, even in the
face of a national foreclosure crisis. In some states, this is at least
partly explained by the fact that the state was not hit very hard by the
foreclosure crisis. However, some states with high rates of
foreclosure during this period did little to change their foreclosure
processes.
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